The Transformation of the Professional Workforce by Crain, Marion
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 79
Issue 2 Symposium: Law and Economics and Legal
Scholarship
Article 11
June 2004
The Transformation of the Professional Workforce
Marion Crain
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This The Piper Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information,
please contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marion Crain, The Transformation of the Professional Workforce, 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 543 (2004).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol79/iss2/11
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL
WORKFORCE
MARION CRAIN*
Is human labor a commodity?1 The Clayton Antitrust Act of
1914 proclaimed that it is not.2 Announcing that labor is not a com-
modity, however, does not make it so. The institution of slavery rep-
resented the complete commodification and objectification of human
beings and their labor. Other workers appear almost fully commodi-
fied-laboring under inhumane and dangerous conditions for mini-
mal wages in poultry processing plants, slaughterhouses,
maquiladoras, sweatshops, and recycling operations.' Partially com-
modified workers toil in industrial settings and service industries
alike, as automobile workers, steelworkers, coal miners, truck drivers,
service employees in fast food restaurants, janitors cleaning offices by
night, hotel maids, and domestic workers cleaning rooms by day.
Commodification of human beings' labor, it seems, is an inevitable
byproduct of advanced capitalism.
4
Where do professionals fall on this commodification continuum?
For professionals, work has historically been a calling that constitutes
* Paul Eaton Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. The University of North
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heimer-offered insightful critiques and comments on the ideas discussed in this Article. I am
grateful to Gail Agrawal and John Conley for especially helpful dialogues on professionalism. I
thank Sabrina Buchsbaum, Gary Redwine, Jennifer Wasson, and Tom Wilhelm for able re-
search assistance.
1. I define commodity here as "an element of economic wealth," "something bought and
sold." See FUNK & WAGNALLS CO., COLLEGE STANDARD DICrIONARY 245 (1943).
2. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17
(2000)) (prohibiting application of antitrust laws to union organizing and collective bargaining).
3. See Tony Horwitz, 9 to Nowhere: These Six Growth Jobs Are Dull, Dead-End, Some-
times Dangerous, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1994, at Al.
4. Nona Glazer has made a powerful case that some service sector employers deliberately
use decommodification as an alternative profit-maximization strategy. See NONA Y. GLAZER,
WOMEN'S PAID AND UNPAID LABOR: THE WORK TRANSFER IN HEALTH CARE AND
RETAILING (1993). Employers who implement self-service labor processes carried out by con-
sumers and patients effectively decommodify the work formerly done by paid employees. By
transferring the work from paid workers to consumers who do it for nothing, employers can
pocket the profits. Id. at 26. Decommodification is most likely to be utilized where economic
markets are contracting. Id. at 216.
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personal identity and confers a relatively privileged class status,
rather than a commodity to be sold on the market.' Professionals'
work is not commodified, but constitutive; not something from which
to escape, but something in which to invest. Professionals' experience
of work has been characterized by autonomy and the privilege to self-
regulate through peer review and codes of ethics enforced by profes-
sional associations. These professional privileges were secured
through a social bargain in which expertise acquired through lengthy
education and dedicated to public service was exchanged for a market
monopoly over the knowledge area in which expertise was asserted.
The professions believed that this social bargain immunized them
from the influence of capitalism and its pressures to commodify hu-
man beings' labor and constrain autonomy in the quest for higher
profits. Professionals' monopoly power over knowledge furnished
sufficient leverage that legislation or unions to protect against abuses
of power by employers seemed superfluous.
The transformation of professional work over the last quarter
century suggests, however, that professionals are not immune from
the commodification process. The shift from self-employed status to
salaried employee status that characterizes most professions in the
information economy has fundamentally altered the conditions under
which this social bargain was formed. Modern profit-maximizing
strategies utilized by corporate employers threaten the autonomy and
monopoly over expertise that professionals historically enjoyed, and
with them professional class privilege. Professionals who once
shunned unions as the antithesis of professionalism are now embrac-
ing them, seeking protection from the labor laws against the effects of
commodification. The American Medical Association and the Ameri-
can Bar Association now endorse unionization. A spate of organizing
by physicians,6 interns and residents,7 graduate students," legal ser-
5. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 105 (1996) (capturing the
distinction between the rank and file and professional workers in this way: "[l]aborers play
notes .... [professionals] play the music"); see generally Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 1881 (2000) (discussing the significance of meaningful work to citizenship and human
existence).
6. See Rick Valliere, Doctors Are Drawn to Unions By Abuses in Health Care System,
Conference Told, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) NO. 189, Sept. 39, 1999, at A-7 (characterizing
unionization among physicians as "growing rapidly" in response to the devaluation of medical
professionalism by managed care).
7. See John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Residents and Students Organizing at
Increasing Rate, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 6, 2001, at 3; see also Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152(1999) (overturning Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976), and its progeny and find-
ing housestaff at private, nonprofit hospitals covered under the Act, including interns, residents,
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vices lawyers,9 and even administrative law judges 0 has attracted legal
and public attention over the last decade.
What forces are prompting professionals in the modern era to
turn toward traditional collective resistance strategies? Are unioniza-
tion and collective bargaining fundamentally incompatible with pro-
fessionalism? This Article explores these questions. I suggest that
collective action by the professions to protect professional autonomy,
status, and privilege is not, in fact, a new phenomenon. Historically,
the professions avoided commodification by exchanging the collective
commodity of their expertise for autonomy at work and monopoly
power over their craft. The transformation of the professional class
from a self-employed group to salaried employee status renders pro-
fessionals vulnerable to the traditional strategies by which manage-
ment has controlled other workers: ideological proletarianization and
technical de-skilling. The increasing pressure for profitability and
related management strategies designed to contain costs-particularly
the use of scientific management and the restructuring of work
through bureaucratization -have fundamentally altered the character
of professional work. When professional autonomy and expertise is
subordinated to management control in the quest for profit maximi-
zation, professionals' very identity as professionals is jeopardized.
The threat to identity is, I believe, the impetus for the current wave of
collective organization. Because professional expertise is collectively
owned, it is logical that professionals would return to collective
strategies to defend it.
A further area of inquiry is whether unionization is likely to be
an effective vehicle for a defense of professional identity and class
privilege. Much depends on whether unions can reconceptualize
themselves in such a way as to attract professionals, and whether the
and clinical fellows). But see Tim Cramm, Note, Prognosis Negative?: An Analysis of Housestaff
Unionization Attitudes in the Wake of Boston Medical Center, 87 IOWA L. REv. 1601, 1625-26
(2002) (suggesting that growth of organizing among housestaff since Boston Medical has been
relatively small).
8. See New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000) (overturning Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974), and finding graduate assistants, teaching assistants, and research
assistants to be covered employees under the Act).
9. See Victoria Rivkin, Legal Services Union Threatens Strike Monday, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 1,
1999, at 1.
10. Administrative law judges in the Social Security Administration unionized in 1999 by
an overwhelming 88 percent majority vote and affiliated with the International Federation of
Professional Technicians and Engineers, AFL-CIO. See William R. Dorsey, SSA ALJs Vote to
Unionize, formerly located at http://www.naalj.org/News%20articles/ssa.htm (on file with au-
thor).
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law can and should flex to accommodate the interests of professionals
in collective organization. This Article engages those questions as
well. The legal barriers to professional organizing are significant. Al-
though the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") explicitly in-
cludes professionals within its definition of covered employees for
purposes of protection of organizing activities and collective bargain-
ing,11 it excludes supervisors and managers.12 Because many profes-
sionals supervise or manage others in bureaucratically organized
workplaces, there exists a tension between those two categories. Re-
cent Supreme Court cases expand the definition of supervisor and
threaten to obliterate the coverage of professionals.13 I outline an
argument for coverage that is grounded in the commodification proc-
ess itself, looking to the ways in which professional work has been
standardized and professionals' autonomy undermined.
Despite the inclusion of professionals in NLRA coverage and the
apparent interest of professionals in organizing, a number of scholars
have demonstrated that the NLRA and accompanying Board and
Court doctrine construing it are a poor fit with collective bargaining
on issues of concern to professionals.14 While pursuing a professional
calling is at its core concerned with exercising power to help or serve
the public rather than with exercising power over others in a hierar-
chical workplace structure, the Act limits protection for concerted
activities (organizing, bargaining, and economic pressure) to self-
interested employee actions directed toward improvement in wages,
hours, and working conditions;"S altruistic concerns or pressure de-
ll. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (2000) (defining professionals for the purpose of bargaining
unit restrictions); 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (2000) (prohibiting the Board from certifying a unit that
includes both professionals and nonprofessionals unless a majority of professionals have voted
for inclusion in the unit).
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2000) (excluding and defining
supervisors); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (interpreting the NLRA's
supervisory exclusion to require the exclusion of managerial employees).
13. See NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (characterizing
nurses as supervisors if they exercise independent, ordinary professional judgment in responsi-
bly directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in the interest of the employer); NLRB v.
Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571 (1994) (finding that nurses who used independ-
ent judgment to responsibly direct nurses' aides in the interests of patient care were doing so in
the employer's interest rather than as a matter of professional obligation, and hence were su-
pervisors).
14. See, e.g., David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bar-
gaining By Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689 (1990) (proposing elimination of the
mandatory-permissive subject matter dichotomy in collective bargaining so that professionals'
bargaining agendas would not be characterized as permissive).
15. See Richard Michael Fischl, Self Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Pro-
test Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 797 (1989).
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signed to advance third parties' interests (such as those of patients,
clients, students, or claimants) are not protected. 6 Thus, any protec-
tion afforded professionals under the Act must be grounded upon
professional self-interest rather than the third-party interests of con-
sumers, patients, or clients. The challenge for unions is to reconcep-
tualize themselves in a way that serves both professionals' self-
interest and their professional/ethical interests in promoting the pub-
lic good, against a backdrop of labor law that protects only the former
goal.
Part I examines sociological research seeking to define the mean-
ing of a profession, and establishes the social bargain protecting pro-
fessional autonomy and privilege. Part II assesses the continuing
viability of this bargain in the emerging information economy, and
outlines the strategies used by corporate management to gain control
over professional expertise. Part III analyzes the commodification of
labor in two paradigmatic professions, those most studied by sociolo-
gists: medicine and law. Part IV discusses the likelihood that profes-
sionals will turn toward unions in response to commodification
processes, utilizing sociological and industrial relations research as
well as actual evidence of organizing activity in the two professions
discussed in Part III. Part V describes unions' efforts to appeal to
both professionals and to Generation X workers, who share a com-
mon ethos of individualism, and offers a blueprint for an alternative
unionism borrowed from the motion picture and television unions.
Part VI returns to the labor law as the guardian of collective action by
workers, theorizing a reconceptualization of professionalism that
makes coverage under the NLRA both justifiable and consistent with
recent Supreme Court precedent.
My central claim is that professional employees who organize to
protect their professional identity are engaged in self-interested ac-
tion to protect their livelihood and class status, and that the law
should support them.7 The Act explicitly covers professional employ-
16. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157,
172-82 (1971) (holding that retirees are not employees covered by the Act, and limiting bargain-
ing obligations over third party concerns to those which vitally affect the terms and conditions
of bargaining unit workers' employment).
17. Some may find it difficult to sympathize with this relatively privileged class of workers
or to support extension of the labor laws to them. Indeed, most left-leaning labor law scholar-
ship-including my own-has focused on the rights of workers at the bottom of the occupa-
tional hierarchy. See, e.g., Marion Crain, Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1313 (2002)
(arguing that unionism has reflected the white experience of class oppression, organizing work-
ers around white identity in occupations dominated by whites, and so proved inadequate to the
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ees. Having lost the collective leverage to hold employers to the his-
torical social bargain, professionals (like other workers) need protec-
tion through unionization and collective bargaining against
commodification. The law's focus in the context of professional orga-
nizing should be on whether management profit-maximizing tech-
niques and policies have stripped professionals of key attributes of
professional status-particularly autonomy and control over the
technical aspects of the labor process itself. To the extent that profes-
sionals have become commodified, they lack sufficient independent
judgment to be characterized as supervisors and excluded from the
labor law's protective umbrella.
I. WHAT IS A PROFESSION? THE SOCIAL BARGAIN CONFERRING
PROFESSIONAL STATUS AND PRIVILEGE
Modern societies institutionalize the valuable commodity of sci-
entific knowledge through the concept of professionalism. 8 Profes-
sions are conceptualized as occupations characterized by a theoretical
knowledge base and skills acquired through extended education and
extensive training; the key characteristic of a professional is that she
applies this knowledge in a nonroutine fashion using independent
discretion and judgment, on a case-by-case basis. 9 Professions tradi-
tionally claim the right to structure and regulate the education and
task of dismantling the racial caste system in employment); Marion Crain & Ken Matheny,
Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1767 (2001) (analyzing court decisions intended to
protect individual minority workers whose interests were not prioritized by their unions, and
showing how race and sex discrimination were systematically defined as beyond the purview of
union concern or the reach of labor laws). My purpose here is twofold: first, understanding how
unionization and labor law function when applied to the "exploitation of the elite" may reveal
new legal arguments or generate new forms of unionism that might be advantageous for those at
the bottom of the hierarchy; and second, the continued viability of the labor movement may
depend upon attracting the highly educated, relatively highly paid white collar workers who
increasingly dominate the information economy.
18. ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF
EXPERT LABOR xii (1988).
19. Id. at 7. The National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act adopt a
strikingly similar definition of "professional." In the case of the NLRA, the term is defined for
purposes of inclusion in coverage and assignment to appropriate bargaining units. See National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (2000); see supra notes 11 & 12. The FLSA, on the
other hand, exempts certain professionals from coverage for overtime wage purposes. See Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2000). Nonetheless, both statutes define a
professional by reference to the intellectual and varied nature of their work, the consequent
need for discretion and judgment in its performance, the incapability of standardizing their
output by units of time, and the advanced training in an educational institution that they un-
dergo. See generally Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing
in New Deal Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212, 2309-11 (1998) (discussing FLSA ex-
emption for professional employees).
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credentialing systems that entitle members to practice. At its core,
then, professionalism entails the right to autonomy at work and the
collective right to exert exclusive authority over members' profes-
sional integrity (the right of peer review). Authority to self-regulate is
founded upon the esoteric character of professional knowledge,
which in turn makes it difficult for the public to assess performance or
for the government to regulate it.20 The professions thus maintain an
economic monopoly over recruitment, training, and credentialing, a
political monopoly over areas of expertise, and an administrative mo-
nopoly over determining what standards shall apply to practitioners.2
The fundamental basis of professionals' claim to occupational
privilege and a market monopoly over specialized areas of expertise is
meritocratic. 22 The university and its professional training program
legitimate the cultural privilege of professionals. 2 The link between
professional status and knowledge is reinforced by hierarchies inter-
nal to the professions. The more closely a professionals' work is
linked to pure knowledge, divorced from public service, the more
status she possesses. In American society, the highest status and privi-
leges are reserved for those who work in the purest professional envi-
ronments, with no or very little client/patient contact. Closest to
working with knowledge alone, their work is done primarily with
other professionals-for example, surgeons, trial lawyers, and profes-
sional consultants. 24
20. Eve Spangler & Peter M. Lehman, Lawyering as Work, in PROFESSIONALS AS
WORKERS: MENTAL LABOR IN ADVANCED CAPITALISM 63 (Charles Derber ed., 1982) [here-
inafter PROFESSIONALS AS WORKERS]; see also Eliot Freidson, Are Professions Necessary?, in
THE AUTHORITY OF EXPERTS: STUDIES IN HISTORY AND THEORY 22 (Thomas L. Haskell ed.,
1984) [hereinafter THE AUTHORITY OF EXPERTS] (noting that professionals' claim to autonomy
at work is founded upon the asserted complexity of the work and the necessity of exercising
discretion and judgment on a case-by-case basis).
21. Freidson,supra note 20, at 20-21.
22. Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Production of Expertise and the Constitution of Expert
Power, in THE AUTHORITY OF EXPERTS, supra note 20, at 28, 43. For a more cynical view on
the character of professionalism as a political monopoly over knowledge institutionalized
through licensing, see PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
1-29 (1982) (arguing that doctors used their professional status to legitimate social authority
and cultural control, to monopolize medical knowledge, and to institutionalize their monopoly
through educational and licensing requirements); RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS
(1989) (making a similar argument with regard to lawyers).
23. Larson, supra note 22, at 53. The university validates not only the individual profes-
sional's claim to expertise, but also the overall status of scientific knowledge. Id.
24. ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 118. However, it is clear that possession of expertise is not
the sole determinant of status within professions; they are structured internally along class lines
as well. Among professionals who deal with clients, differentiation in wealth and societal status
of clients affords vicarious status to those professionals who deal with them: the more prestig-
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Society thus grants the professions elevated social status and an
implicit right to working conditions that other employees do not en-
joy-particularly autonomy, freedom from external authority, the
right to work without supervisory constraint, and the right to select
work goals and to exercise one's skills consistent with professional
ethics and training.2 5 In exchange, the professions promise to undergo
extended and painstaking professional education and training in or-
der to master the bodies of knowledge reserved to them, and to dedi-
cate themselves unselfishly to society's needs. Professionals are
expected to prioritize their patients' and clients' interests above their
own, even at the cost of personal risk to health, freedom, or well-
being. A 1975 article by Dr. Sanford Marcus, founder of the Union of
American Physicians and Dentists, explained the justification for the
bargain eloquently in the context of the medical profession:
The physician as healer has been accorded a place of respect and
esteem by the very nature of the service he rendered-personal
concern, amelioration of suffering, quasi-mystical intervention in
the struggle between life and inevitability of death, these were his
stock in trade. There was the tacit acceptance of the fact that he
should be accorded a special niche in society, measured both by the
honor it accorded him and by a standard of living that was reasona-
bly expected to be somewhat above others whose responsibilities
were less than his. His long years of training, hours of service, risk
of exposure to disease, shortened earning life-span, attenuated
freedom and family life, and devotion to professional self-
advancement all seemed to justify a special status. In return, the
American medical profession developed a high standard of medical
care that was unequaled anywhere in the world, indeed a fair ex-
change, it would seem.2 6
Any analysis of the professions must, however, take into account
the self-interested nature of professionalism. Professional associa-
tions, like craft unions, function to secure and maintain a market mo-
nopoly over knowledge. 27 The professions are market organizations
ious the client, the more prestige the work done for him has. Id. at 122; Spangler & Lehman,
supra note 20, at 75.
25. Charles Derber, Professionals As New Workers, in PROFESSIONALS As WORKERS,
supra note 20, at 1; Charles Derber, The Proletarianization of the Professional, in
PROFESSIONALS As WORKERS, supra note 20, at 13.
26. GRACE BUDRYS, WHEN DOCTORS JOIN UNIONS 39 (1997) (quoting Sanford A. Mar-
cus, The Purposes of Unionization in the Medical Profession: The Unionized Profession's Per-
spective in the United States, 5 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 37, 37-38 (1975)).
27. The concept of professionalism functions in a way exactly parallel to unionization: by
expanding and protecting the power base (in this case, knowledge and social status), profession-
alism enhances collective mobility up the class ladder. MAGALI SARFATri LARSON, THE RISE
OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 155-56 (1977).
[Vol 79:543
2004] THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL WORKFORCE 551
that exercise intellectual and organizational domination over areas of
social concern.28 While professionals frequently do not produce a dis-
tinctive commodity separate from their professional services, the in-
tangible goods produced by professionals are inextricably bound to
the producer, the professional. Thus, the producer herself must be
"produced" -trained and socialized into the profession-to provide
distinctive, recognizable services. 29 Professional standards are estab-
lished by the professions, and monopoly power over the market for
them is enforced by the state. Competing products are eliminated;
licensure, qualifying exams, and a diploma are the tools by which the
monopoly is maintained.30 In effect, the commodity that professional
associations market to society is knowledge itself, and knowledge
workers are the delivery system for that commodity.
A further safeguard for the valuable commodity of professional
knowledge is the holistic way in which the professions define the pro-
fessional enterprise. The essence of professional work is that neither
professional products nor professional services can be broken down
into component parts and standardized; commodification of individ-
ual professionals is the antithesis of professionalism.3' Technological
advances-particularly those that enhance the spread of informa-
tion-exacerbate the threat of commodification because they increase
the potential that professional knowledge will be transformed into
commodities that can be separated from the professional herself.
32
Thus, the professions have historically acted collectively in estab-
lishing and asserting a property right in expertise and a concomitant
28. ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 5-6 (discussing the work of Magali Sarfatti Larson).
29. LARSON, supra note 27, at 14.
30. Id. at 14-15.
31. Freidson, supra note 20, at 22. Commodification of professional products and services
has long posed a threat to professionalism. Fixed legal form wills, contracts, leases, and divorce
documents all exemplify the specter of commodification, rendering lawyers unnecessary to
complete simple legal transactions. ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 146.
32. ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 147. The use of computer diagnostics and artificial intelli-
gence systems in medicine furnishes one example of such a threat to professional work. Id.
Technology has the capacity to absorb the expertise and, ultimately, the work itself from the
professions, just as it has from many nonprofessional occupations. See id. at 149.
In a more indirect and insidious fashion, technology also enhances the role of physical
capital in structuring and controlling professional work, rendering professionals more depend-
ent on organizations that can afford to purchase and maintain such machinery and equipment-
just as manual workers are dependent upon the corporation that owns and maintains the manu-
facturing plant or assembly line. Id. at 156; see also Nathan Newman, Trade Secrets and Collec-
tive Bargaining: A Solution to Resolving Tensions in the Economics of Innovations, 6 EMP.
RIGHTS & EMP. POL'Y J. 1, 23 (2002) (observing that where workers' skills and innovation are
dependent on their employers' machinery, employees are effectively anchored to the firm; the
"sheer physicality of machinery" is a more powerful shackle than any legal rule).
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right to control and exploit that property for personal profit.33 The
leverage conferred by the possession of knowledge facilitated a social
contract that allowed the professions to protect their jurisdiction over
this knowledge base by controlling who entered the craft, the dis-
semination of abstract knowledge relative to the craft, and its tech-
niques. Control over knowledge and technique is the quintessential
element that defines, structures and maintains any craft; professionals
are no different than other skilled workers in this regard. The differ-
ence in their economic status and socially privileged position is one of
degree, rather than one of kind.
II. THE FUTURE OF PROFESSIONS IN AN ADVANCED CAPITALIST
INFORMATION ECONOMY: IS THE SOCIAL BARGAIN STILL VIABLE?
Social commentators once hailed the knowledge worker-
including, especially, the professions-as the ascending star in the
information economy. As power shifted from those who owned the
physical means of production to those who possessed and controlled
knowledge, many believed that professionals would enjoy enhanced
power and status relative to that of physical-capital owners.34 Daniel
Bell, John Kenneth Galbraith, Alvin Gouldner, and others argued
that the role of knowledge would be so central in the postindustrial
economy that expertise would metamorphose into the new critical
resource, conferring further leverage on professionals and the intel-
lectual class as a whole.35 These scholars, dubbed "functionalists" be-
cause they viewed the professions' elevated social status as
instrumental in maintaining a stable society,36 argued that in a society
increasingly ordered by scientific and rational standards, those who
possess the knowledge to create, disseminate, and apply the standards
would play a powerful strategic role in the division of labor. Ulti-
mately, professionals would define for capital owners the limits and
possibilities of the production process, revolutionizing the way in
33. See DONALD CLARK HODGES, CLASS POLITICS IN THE INFORMATION AGE xii (2000).
34. Derber, Professionals As New Workers, supra note 25, at 4 (citing DANIEL BELL, THE
COMING OF POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING (1976) and
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (4th ed. 1985)); see also ALVIN W.
GOULDNER, THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUALS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW CLASS 4-7, 53-57
(1979) (arguing that the intellectual class would emerge as the "new" revolutionary class, sup-
planting the working class).
35. See supra note 34.
36. See BUDRYS, supra note 26, at 34-35 (discussing work of Talcott Parsons).
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which jobs were constituted and work was performed.37 The function-
alists warned that jobs must be sufficiently challenging and rich to
attract such professionals as market demand grew to exceed the sup-
ply.38
Other scholars, known as revisionists, believed that the profes-
sional class was little more than a political creation of the capitalist
class, and hence dependent upon it for maintenance of its monopoly
over knowledge work.39 Some predicted the evolution of a new pro-
fessional-managerial class with one foot in each class: the "profes-
sional-managerial" class would simultaneously manage lower-level
professional and nonprofessional employees and be managed by
higher-level administrators. 40 This positioning would create a unique
set of interests that would shield professionals from complete prole-
tarianization,4' or loss of control over the labor process, while leaving
them vulnerable to the loss of professional autonomy and control
over the ends to which their work is put (loss of ideological control).
Though freed from the "petty forms of supervision or humiliation"
that other employees endured, the professional-managerial class in an
advanced capitalist economy would still be subjected to increased
levels of supervision, heightened specialization and division of labor,
and increased estrangement from policymaking. 42 "Organically" tied
to the class whose interests are upheld by its work and products,
namely capital, a3 the professional-managerial class would be a de-
pendent social formation, incapable of representing itself, and fun-
damentally allied with the capital-owning class.44 Ultimately, the
37. Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 63-64.
38. See e.g., J. Richard Hackman, What is Happening to Professional Work?, 2 PERSP. ON
WORK 4, 6 (1998); see generally PETER F. DRUCKER, THE AGE OF DISCONTINUITY:
GUIDELINES TO OUR CHANGING SOCIETY (1968).
39. These scholars include C. Wright Mills, Magali Sarfatti Larson, and Barbara and John
Ehrenreich. See Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 64.
40. Derber, The Proletarianization of the Professional, supra note 25, at 20-21 (discussing
the work of Barbara and John Ehrenreich).
41. "Proletarianization" as used by these theorists refers to "the human and social effects
of capitalists' efforts to maintain an acceptable rate of exploitation," including automation,
mechanization, and strategies that increase the scale of production in order to increase the rate
of fixed capital assets to labor. JERRY LEMBCKE, CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND CLASS
CAPACITIES: MARXIST THEORY AND UNION ORGANIZATION 6-7 (1988).
42. Derber, The Proletarianization of the Professional, supra note 25, at 21.
43. See LARSON, supra note 27, at xiv (discussing the views of Antonio Gramsci).
44. See, e.g., Stanley Aronowitz, The Professional-Managerial Class or Middle Strata, in
BETWEEN LABOUR AND CAPITAL 213, 217-19, 224-25 (Pat Walker ed., 1979).
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professional-managerial class would suffer a diminishing scope of
autonomy as it was curbed by the elites that it served.4 5
The revisionists worried that the professional class would use its
privileged position to exploit those beneath it in the occupational
hierarchy. For example, because physicians achieved and maintained
dominance by monopolizing control over medical work, eliminating
competition from other groups, and institutionalizing their dominance
through licensing requirements, they were likely to resist expansion
efforts by nurses or other skilled workers beneath them in the hierar-
chy of medical occupations.46
Functionalists believe that professionals' power base of expertise
is real, while revisionists argue that it is socially constructed. Thus,
functionalists are confident about the continuing strength of profes-
sionals' class position, while revisionists question its stability if the
monopoly over knowledge is lost. Revisionists point out that in fact
much of the work done by professionals can be performed by less
skilled, less educated workers (paralegals rather than lawyers, physi-
cians' assistants or nurses rather than doctors), creating the opportu-
nity for job fragmentation and de-skilling by cost-conscious
managers. 47 Functionalists also trust the validity of the educational
system as a purveyor of both knowledge and values. They believe that
professional training is effective to transmit knowledge and to incul-
cate professional ethics and values essential to maintaining the pub-
lic's trust. Revisionists agree that knowledge is effectively transmitted
through professional training, but assert that professional training
functions to discipline the minds of students, transforming "naive
outsiders" into "knowledgeable insiders," a process in which "naive
idealism is tempered to become realistic idealism.' 48 More impor-
tantly, revisionists observe, professional training performs a screening
and sorting function, limiting the supply of licensed professionals en-
tering the field, thus preserving the market position of those already
in practice. 49
The significance of the differences between these two schools of
thought cannot be overstated: functionalists predict increasing or sus-
45. Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 64.
46. See BUDRYS, supra note 26, at 36-37 (discussing Eliot Freidson's work).
47. Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 65-66.
48. Id. at 66; see generally JEFF SCHMIDT, DISCIPLINED MINDS: A CRITICAL LOOK AT
SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AND THE SOUL-BATTERING SYSTEM THAT SHAPES THEIR LIVES
(2000).
49. Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 67.
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tained power for the professional class, since the basis of its power-
abstract knowledge and technical skills-is real. Revisionists predict
that since professional power rests on an artificially maintained mo-
nopoly of knowledge and skill, an increased demand for professional
services in an information society will induce capitalists to take meas-
ures to control and constrain that monopoly.5U
In the remainder of this Part and the next, I show that the revi-
sionists were correct. Rather than becoming more rich and interest-
ing, professionals' jobs in the new millennium have constricted. For
many, influence over job content and performance, autonomy, and
ability to exercise professional discretion is increasingly limited.5
Market instability accompanying the shift from an industrial economy
to a postindustrial, service sector, information economy has yielded
profit-driven management techniques that increasingly threaten to
undermine the autonomy, judgment, and control over job content and
performance that once characterized professional status. Principles of
scientific management (or "Taylorism"),' 2 originally developed for
application to manual labor, were ultimately applied to white-collar
work and to the professions through the medium of bureaucratiza-
tion.53
A. Scientific Management
An important strategic tool in employers' control over manual
labor was scientific management, which achieved popularity during
the first half of the twentieth century. Scientific management refers to
the systematic process of dividing jobs up into discrete components so
as to centralize control over the knowledge of the labor process in
management and increase profits. Its aim is to wrest from skilled
workers control over the knowledge that constitutes the craft.
50. Id. at 69.
51. See Hackman, supra note 38, at 4-6.
52. Taylorism was the brainchild of Frederick Winslow Taylor, who advocated the applica-
tion of "scientific" methods to the problem of controlling labor. See generally HARRY
BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 85-121 (1974); DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF
LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1915 at 9-57,
214-56 (1987) [hereinafter MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR]; DAVID
MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF WORK,
TECHNOLOGY, AND LABOR STRUGGLES 9-10 (1979) [hereinafter MONTGOMERY, WORKERS'
CONRTOL].
53. See STANLEY ARONOWITZ, FALSE PROMISES: THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN WORKING
CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 291-93 (1992).
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Through the use of time and motion studies designed to maximize
output, skilled workers become automatons tending machines. 54
Scientific management techniques typically involve an in-depth
study of the craft and subsequent reduction of its principles or knowl-
edge base to a series of rules, which can be delegated to less-skilled or
specialized workers in the interest of efficiency and profit maximiza-
tion. Execution is severed from conception, and conception is central-
ized in management. Management plans the work of every category
of employee, specifying each day what tasks are to be done, the way
in which they should be done, and the time allotted for completing
them. Workers thus lose control over the content of their work, its
pace, and the manner in which it is performed. 55 As one scholar sum-
marized it, Taylorism is the "effort to strip the workers of craft
knowledge and autonomous control and confront them with a fully
thought-out labor process in which they function as cogs and levers. 56
Scientific management, as its name implies, purports to subject
workers and employers to the objective laws of science rather than to
the arbitrary whims of human beings. The substitution of neutral
norms of efficiency mutes class conflict since all are subject to its rules
and science legitimates it.57 Science, rather than class interest, appears
to constrain the worker.58
Scientific management was used very successfully to maximize
output in the industrial workplace, particularly among relatively low-
skilled workers. Control over the technical aspects of the work was
achieved through the use of technology that structured both the work
process and the workplace. The assembly line was the prototypical
example of technological control: production appeared to be regu-
lated by the technology rather than by people. Work was divided into
discrete tasks that could be more efficiently performed by a single
worker who specialized in that particular assembly. No worker pos-
54. See Newman, supra note 32, at 22. One of the most powerful depictions of this process
of dehumanization attendant to scientific management is contained in the classic documentary
film entitled Clockwork, which features the application of Taylor's principles to unskilled work-
ers moving objects from one place to another. Drawings and motion picture renderings reduce
the person doing the work to a stick figure to illustrate the efficiencies of one style of motion
over another. Throughout the video, stick figures represent the workers whose labor is being
analyzed, deconstructed, and reconstructed into the most efficient, profit-maximizing form.
55. See BRAVERMAN, supra note 52, at 85-121; MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE
OF LABOR, supra note 52, at 9-57, 214-56; MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL, supra note
52, at 9-10.
56. BRAVERMAN, supra note 52, at 136.
57. LARSON, supra note 27, at 141-42.
58. Id. at 142.
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sessed a complete picture of the product; the conception of work was
divided from its execution. The assembly line controlled the pace of
work, the timing of breaks, and even the physical movements made to
complete tasks.59
B. Bureaucratization
If scientific management was the key tool in bringing unskilled
workers under the thumb of the industrial machine, bureaucratization
was its parallel in the sphere of the skilled worker. In the bureaucratic
reorganization of work, management's profit goals are brought to
bear on the labor process in such a way that the skilled worker's work
is transformed. 6° Ultimately, the worker's control over his craft is un-
dermined. Outsiders come to exercise control over the labor process,
resulting in a dramatic loss of authority and autonomy.61
Bureaucratization is superficially similar to scientific manage-
ment. Bureaucratization refers to the manipulation of the social or-
ganization of work through a pattern of specialization scientifically
designed to maximize productivity; in this respect, it closely resembles
scientific management. Bureaucratization adds, however, a system of
rules and regulations that impose a hierarchical structure upon the
specialized positions, and a sharp differentiation between manage-
ment, professionals, and support staff.62 Bureaucratic control over
skilled workers-including professionals-is achieved through imper-
sonal rules, evaluation and promotion mechanisms rather than
through personal supervision.63 Cloaked in the garb of neutrality,
meritocracy, and objectivity, bureaucratization is consistent with pro-
fessionals' conception of their own status and expertise.64 Nonethe-
less, bureaucratic control ultimately and insidiously molds workers to
organizational objectives and ties them to a division of labor concep-
tualized by management and policed by the application of "neutral"
59. Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 70-71.
60. Derber, The Proletarianization of the Professional, supra note 25, at 14.
61. Richard W. Hurd, Professional Workers, Unions and Associations: Affinities and An-
tipathies, at http://www.shankerinstitute.org/Downloads/hurd.doc (background paper prepared
for The Albert Shanker Institute Seminar on Unions Organizing Professionals, Summer 2000).
62. Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 72.
63. Derber, The Proletarianization of the Professional, supra note 25, at 18 (summarizing
RICHARD EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORKPLACE IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1979)).
64. Id.
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rules and policies.65 The rule-bound hierarchical differentiation tends
to direct workers' energies toward individual advancement opportu-
nities, distracting them from making common cause with other work-
ers and muting dissent through the appearance of the rules as
objective and meritocratic, as well as through the distancing of super-
visory and managerial personnel from decisions made pursuant to
rules.66
Bureaucratic control effectively metamorphoses into ideological
control over the work objectives and process because only manage-
ment speaks and interacts directly with the larger society (i.e., patients
are clients of the institution, not patients of an individual doctor). 67
Professionals thus lose the ability to forge their own relationships
with clients or to define the uses to which their skills are put; man-
agement makes those decisions. 68 Of the various modes of control,
bureaucratic control is probably the hardest to resist for professionals
because it isolates the worker from the community that he or she
serves.
69
C. Deprofessionalization
Professionals' historical status as self-employed entrepreneurs
was instrumental in avoiding commodification of professional work
through scientific management or bureaucratization. The shift away
from self-employment and increasing dependence of the professions
upon large organizations as an institutional base for the exercise of
professional authority create the potential for the application of tech-
niques designed to control and restrict professionals' sphere of influ-
ence.70 Technological advances and the cost of machinery and
technology that individual professionals could not afford made it in-
creasingly difficult for professionals to own the "means of produc-
tion."71 Centralized administration became necessary in order to cope
with the demands of a mass clientele and legal/administrative re-
quirements (as in medicine, with the advent of managed care)., As
65. Id.
66. Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 72.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 72-73.
69. Id.
70. Charles Derber, Managing Professionals: Ideological Proletarianization and Mental
Labor, in PROFESSIONALS AS WORKERS, supra note 20, at 167, 168, 172-73.
71. Derber, Professionals as New Workers, supra note 25, at 6.
72. Id. at 6-7.
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professionals combined within large single multi-professional work-
places, the fundamental nature of professional work-and especially
professionals' autonomy and control over their work-changed.7 3
Multi-professional worksites such as hospitals, law firms, accounting
firms, and architectural firms organized professionals to work in lay-
ers. Such multi-professional worksites developed their own internal
hierarchies of professions.7 4
For the first time, professionals found themselves vulnerable to
the management techniques to which nonprofessional workers had
long been subject. Professionals followed the pattern established in
the crafts: they lost control first over the ideological direction of their
work (the product itself, and the ends to which it is put), and later
over the technical aspects of the labor process (how tasks will be car-
ried out and time/pace of work)."
1. Ideological Control
Ideological proletarianization posed a significant threat to pro-
fessional identity. It stripped professionals of their sense of profes-
sional values and purpose, restricting the professions to the realm of
technique.76 The loss of professional autonomy and ideological con-
trol is especially grave for a group that has traditionally approached
its work as a calling.77 With the loss of ideological control, the bonds
connecting professionals to the larger community that they are
charged with serving become frayed. 78 The service and knowledge
goals possessed by professionals that are most closely aligned with
those of clients or of the larger society recede in significance, while
the market interests of professionals in high income, social status, and
73. See id. at 7.
74. ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 151.
75. Derber, The Proletarianization of the Professional, supra note 25, at 30; Derber, supra
note 70, at 169-70.
76. Derber, supra note 70, at 172.
77. Id. at 180. Professionals tend to be more highly invested in the work role than other
workers. LARSON, supra note 27, at 60. Moreover, the threat to stability and expectations of
upward mobility posed by deskilling is especially serious for professionals since the very allure
of professionalism is its promise of an orderly progression through a work-life plan: "career is a
pattern of organization of the self." Id. at 229. Most professionals are conformists who rely on
the prospect of predictable and continuous rewards and are willing "to adopt a long view and
defer immediate gratification." Such a "life plan" is a central aspect of professionals' privileged
status. Id. at 229.
78. Derber, supra note 70, at 173.
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career advancement assume priority as professionals relinquish ideo-
logical control yet attempt to cling to technical control. 79
In an effort to adapt their expectations to: the shifting conditions
of their worksites, professionals dissociated themselves from the ideo-
logical context of their work, withdrawing from areas in which they
lacked voice or power, and investing instead in the areas in which
they still enjoyed power (technical expertise). 8° Nonetheless, many
professionals remain deeply committed to cognitive goals and feel
entitled to do work that is challenging and stimulating. They are not
committed to ideological goals, however, nor do they require that
their work serve socially useful ends.81 They dissociate themselves
from the uses to which their work is put, and deny interest or respon-
sibility for it.82 The professional adapts further by aligning herself with
the employing institution and advancing institutional goals and inter-
ests rather than those of clients, professional values and ethics, or
larger societal interests. 83 At the same time, professionals redefine
their personal goals so that they are congruent with institutional
goals.84 Their work life patterns become organized by the bureau-
cratic standards to which they are subject: those surrounding criteria
for advancement and institutionalized promotions. Indeed, they may
even organize to demand more bureaucratization, preferring it to the
arbitrariness of management by direct supervision.8
2. Technical Control
The professions initially defended their professional status by
expanding their technical expertise. 86 The retention of technical dis-
79. Id. at 174.
80. Id. at 180-84 (describing "ideological desensitization"). This explains why professional
education and training emphasize technical knowledge and expertise as of greater import than
ethical or social concerns; a "disinterested" stance is assumed toward the uses or potential uses
of professionals' work. Education deliberately performs this function in law, medicine, and even
nursing. Id. at 182-84. See also SCHMIDT, supra note 48 (describing the role of professional
education in socializing professionals toward ideological dissociation and disenfranchisement).
81. Derber, supra note 70, at 182.
82. Id. at 180.
83. Id. at 174-75.
84. Id. at 185-88 (describing "ideological cooptation").
85. LARSON, supra note 27, at 233.
86. Derber, supra note 70, at 174. Derber writes that professionals at some point made a
"Faustian pact" with employers, giving up ideological control in exchange for the privileges of
status and technical authority. Id. Thus, he asserts, it should not surprise us when professionals
who witness their corporate employers engaging in acts incongruent with professional values
"swallow the whistle" rather than blowing it, subordinating personal and professional values to
organizational loyalty and discipline. Id. at 177.
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cretion over the day-to-day attributes of work assisted professionals
in maintaining, at least temporarily, many of their professional privi-
leges and status.87 Ultimately, however, management began to chip
away at professionals' technical expertise as well. As in the crafts,
technical proletarianization proceeded in two phases: first, workers
lost control over their time; later, the work itself was standardized
according to a plan devised by management. 8
a. Time
Time is a critical measure of the worth of work. Indeed, the basis
of the entire occupational hierarchy is that the time of those in subor-
dinate positions is worth less than the time of those in supervisory
positions, so that tasks must be delegated for reasons of cost effec-
tiveness.89 Not surprisingly, then, loss of control over hours of work
and pace of work are a significant source of concern among profes-
sionals because they signal a loss of status. The core attribute of pro-
fessional work is that because it requires the exercise of discretion
and judgment and cannot be standardized, "it cannot be established
from the outside that a given result should be obtained in a given
time. "90
The "tyranny of the clock" is a powerful contributor to the alien-
ation of workers from their work. Studies of industrial workers indi-
cate that lack of control over the immediate work situation, especially
the rhythm and pace of work, is demoralizing. 91 Magali Larson ex-
plains how loss of control over time is particularly significant for pro-
fessionals because it threatens their identity, and with it their class
status:
Even if their products and the organization of their work lives es-
cape their control, they are masters of their time; this freedom ex-
tends from apparently trivial but nevertheless fundamental aspects
of the work situation all the way to the discretion which they enjoy
in the productive activity itself. Experts are not usually asked to
punch time cards, they take their coffee breaks when they like, they
arrange their work schedules and vacations with relative freedom,
they have free access to telephones .... In their work, they tend to
have absolute discretion, even though their own decisions are in-
87. See Derber, The Proletarianization of the Professional, supra note 25, at 30.
88. See Derber, supra note 70, at 171.
89. See LARSON, supra note 27, at 235-36.
90. Id. at 235 (emphasis in original).
91. Id.
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serted within the framework of goals and strategies chosen by oth-
ers.
92
b. Standardization of Tasks
Bureaucratic organization of work has proven effective in expro-
priating knowledge from the professions, standardizing what is
known, and dividing it among professionals through specialization of
function organized in hierarchical fashion. Like the assembly line, the
effect of bureaucratization is to press professionals toward specializa-
tion in order to produce economies of scale while potentially raising
the quality of service. 93 As the professional specializes, he or she be-
comes a mere technician, sacrificing the freedom of broad scope pro-
fessional work and losing the ability to establish the objectives of his
or her own work.94 When specialized professionals perform under the
direction of management, often coordinating with other professionals
in a division of labor specified by management, they relinquish the
autonomy and control over the objectives of their work that they
once possessed. 95 Thus, professional knowledge increasingly becomes
encoded in the structure of the organizations rather than residing with
professionals themselves. Professional work itself is restructured and
standardized by administrators (perhaps themselves a new profes-
sional class!) who strive to maximize the economic returns to the or-
ganization. 96
D. From A Service Economy to an Encounter Economy?
Some sociologists have identified a concomitant shift in service-
providing by employers that moves from a focus on providing deliv-
ery of a service to a customer or patient, to a focus on delivering ser-
vices via "encounters. '" 97 This is a potentially powerful form of
commodification with important ramifications for the professions
because it separates the service from the professional provider. In-
stead of a customer/patient-caregiver/service-provider relationship at
the point of service delivery, "encounter" service deliveries are char-
92. Id.
93. See Derber, The Proletarianization of the Professional, supra note 25, at 16.
94. Id. at 16-17.
95. Id. at 17.
96. ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 325.
97. See Barbara A. Gutek, Service Workers: Human Resources or Labor Costs?, 544
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 68,69 (1996).
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acterized by a single-episode encounter with a service-provider who is
fungible with any other similar provider. Purchasing fast-food epito-
mizes the encounter service, as does obtaining medical care through
an HMO.98 Not only can lower-cost labor be substituted for higher-
cost labor on the provider side (patients may see nurse practitioners
and physicians' assistants instead of medical doctors, and psycholo-
gists or social workers instead of psychiatrists), 99 but the delivery side
may entail a single provider servicing multiple customers (doctors see
groups of patients with similar complaints at the same time), lOO par-
ticularly with the aid of technology (a single professor may impart
knowledge to students at multiple schools around the country
through teleconferencing used in distance learning programs; U-scan
machines in grocery stores and retail department stores may be over-
seen by one teller;101 specialists can be centralized and their services
made available to remote locations through telemedicinel°2).
Consistent with the loss of ideological control over work that
characterizes deprofessionalization, encounter providers generally
emphasize delivery style or process rather than expertise or relation-
ship, which lies at the core of traditional provider relationships. 103
Encounter providers "have jobs that are less challenging, more
monotonous, more stressful, less autonomous, require less skill, have
lower wages, and tend not to provide workers with skills that allow
them to advance in the organization. "1° Encounter providers' jobs
have been Taylorized: Instead of making decisions about which ser-
98. Id.
99. See id. at 70.
100. See Barbara Martinez, Now It's Mass Medicine: Doctors Start Seeing Groups of Patients
to Save Time; One-on-One vs. One-on-12, WALL ST. J., AUG. 21, 2000, AT B1 (reporting that
Kaiser Permanente doctors are utilizing group visits, particularly for patients with common
chronic ailments, such as diabetes, arthritis, or hypertension, or for those needing routine pedi-
atric or geriatric care; one physician can service twenty-four patients in a single two-hour group
session utilizing this strategy).
101. See GLAZER, supra note 4, at 18-19 (noting expense of machinery and technology
required to facilitate the reduction in labor costs).
102. See TELEMEDICINE: A GUIDE TO ASSESSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN HEALTH
CARE 18 (Marilyn J. Field ed., 1996). Telemedicine is defined as "the use of electronic informa-
tion and communications technologies to provide and support health care when distance sepa-
rates the participants," and it ranges from telephone and radio use to communicate to
"telesurgery," in which a surgeon is provided with visual and tactile information which is used to
guide robotic instruments to perform surgery at a distant site. Id. at 16.
103. See Gutek, supra note 97, at 74-75.
104. Id. at 74. Even highly skilled providers can be encounter providers-for example,
surgeons who perform only hernia operations, at clinics that offer only hernia operations to
patients who are otherwise healthy. Id.
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vices to provide, they simply carry out a directive that someone at a
policy-making level has already issued.' 5
Loss of technical control over work is inherent in this commodi-
fication strategy. Product standardization ensures that service-
providers need not possess special information, expertise, or discre-
tion.1 6 Although the substitution of the encounter provider for the
relationship service provider and the standardization of services has
significant benefits for the public-some who could never before af-
ford such services now may be able to-its labor cost-savings aspects
also hold the threat of commodifying all service occupations, and in-
deed, ultimately automating them or eliminating them.' 07
The next Part traces the loss of ideological and technical control
over work in particular professions-medicine and law-in order to
provide more detail and depth to these observations about the com-
modification of professionals through control of their labor process.
III. THE COMMODIFICATION OF MEDICINE AND LAW
Some of the most striking organizing initiatives underway at pre-
sent are taking place in medicine and in law, where dissatisfaction
with the state of the professions themselves appears widespread. This
Part traces the transformation of the structure of employment in
those two professions, with an eye toward linking structural changes
to organizing initiatives in Part IV.
A. Medicine
The quintessential image of a medical professional is a physician
who operates a sole proprietorship or is a partner in a small partner-
ship. While this image once reflected the reality of the structure of the
medical profession, it appears increasingly outdated: the modern phy-
sician is more and more likely to be an employee, not an entrepre-
neur. In 1983, approximately 75 percent of physicians were self-
employed, either in group or solo practices.S By 1999, only 62 per-
105. See id. at 76.
106. See GLAZER, supra note 4, at 27-28 (discussing role of product or service standardiza-
tion in facilitating both self-service in the retail industry and deprofessionalization through the
use of standard protocols in the delivery of health care).
107. Gutek, supra note 97, at 71, 82.
108. Paul D. Staudohar & James B. Dworkin, Doctors and Unions, 9 J. INDIVIDUAL EMP.
RTS. 197, 199 (2001).
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cent of physicians were self-employed; 1°9 the remainder (38 percent)
were salaried employees of group practices, hospitals, or other health
care institutions.110 It seems likely that the trend toward employee
status will continue.111
Salaried employee physicians are typically employed in bureau-
cratic settings (hospital, HMO, teaching, research, or administra-
tion).112 Modern medical education ensures a dependence of
physicians on technology and subordinate staff to whom the physician
can delegate tasks; lacking these, it is difficult for physicians to satisfy
current standards of care. 3 Moreover, rising malpractice costs," 4 the
growth of specialization,'1 5 regulatory legislation and paperwork all
109. Id. Physicians defined as self-employed include solo practitioners, partners, or major
shareholders in group medical practices. At law, some physician partners and shareholders are
categorized as employees, see infra note 172, so the percentage of self-employed physicians is
arguably even lower.
110. Staudohar & Dworkin, supra note 108, at 199; Margery Gordon, Diagnosis: Labor
Unrest, CORPORATE COUNSEL, Feb. 14, 2002. Some estimates put the percentages of salaried
employee-physicians even higher. See Ellen L. Luepke, White Coat, Blue Collar: Physician
Unionization and Managed Care, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 275, 283 (1999) (estimating that 45
percent of physicians are employed on a salaried basis by hospitals, HMOs, or other institu-
tions); see also Tracey I. Levy, Collective Bargaining in the Elite Professions-Doctors' Applica-
tion of the Labor Law Model to Negotiations With Health Plan Providers, 13 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 269, 270 (2002) (estimating that 43 percent of physicians are employed).
111. In the past five years, eighty to eighty-five percent of all doctors entering the profession
took salaried positions in medical institutions. Barry Liebowitz, Medical Doctors Turn to Un-
ions, WORKING USA, Fall 2000, at 27, 30-31. The Doctors' Council predicts that by 2010, more
than 80 percent of all physicians will be salaried employees of hospitals and medical centers. Id.
at 31.
112. See John B. McKinlay, Toward the Proletarianization of Physicians, in PROFESSIONALS
AS WORKERS, supra note 20, at 37, 42-44.
113. Id. at 45.
114. According to the AMA, some twelve states are in "crisis" mode, with malpractice
premiums threatening to drive doctors to other states or out of particularly high-risk practice
areas. See Ertel Berry, Bill Would Cap Medmal Damages, Contingency Fees, N.C. LAW. WKLY.,
FEB. 17, 2003, at 1, 3 (discussing a bill pending in North Carolina legislature).
115. Reasonable minds differ on whether specialization detracts from or promotes quality of
service. On the one hand, the sheer proliferation of medical knowledge and technology associ-
ated with it arguably renders specialization essential in order to master the knowledge base and
maximize high standards of patient care. McKinlay, supra note 112, at 50-52. As patients them-
selves have become better educated and more sophisticated, public confidence in physicians has
waned; it is logical that physicians would seek to meet this pressure by increasing their level of
kifowlede through specialization. See id. at 57. On the other hand, the pressure to specialize
shares some features of scientific management, as work is broken down into smaller and dis-
crete parts, and execution separated from overall conception of a treatment plan. This is par-
ticularly visible at the bottom end of the skills hierarchy, as less skilled actors, including nurse
practitioners, physician's assistants, allied health workers, and midwives, perform the same work
that physicians once did, albeit with less training and at a far lower cost to the institution. Id. at
52. Similarly, the work once done by RNs can and has been divided and assigned to a series of
aides and technicians, redesigning patient care processes and creating mini-assembly lines. See
James E. Eggleston, Patient Advocacy and Consumer Protection Through Union Activism:
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combine to push physicians into larger workplaces where they will be
shielded somewhat from these costs. 116 High student debt loads at-
tributable to rising tuition costs undoubtedly contribute to the finan-
cial pressure on young physicians to pursue a traditional employment
relationship.
The health care delivery system is notorious for its bureaucrati-
zation.117 Advances in medical technology, large numbers of people
needing care, and a need for centralization have produced a focus on
efficiency and economies of scale.11 8 Indeed, cost reduction was the
explicit motivation for the shift to managed care.119 It is not surprising
to find tension between the twin goals of quality medical care and
cost reduction; managed care is the guardian of the cost reduction
side of the equation. 120
1. Loss of Ideological Control: The Meaning of Care
Managed care organizations control costs by redefining the stan-
dard of medical care. The major tools in the cost containment arsenal
include case control or utilization management (a process that pro-
vides guidelines for all health care decisions made during the stages of
diagnosis and treatment, including standardized diagnostic tests, pre-
scription drugs, and hospital stays), and retrospective claims review
after the care is concluded.12 Failure to adhere to these standards is
Protecting Health Care Consumers, Patients and Workers During an Unprecedented Restructur-
ing of the Health Care Industry, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 925, 935 (1997).
116. McKinlay, supra note 112, at 45-46. Self-employed physicians have felt the squeeze of
managed care, as well: managed care health plans have the ability to direct significant volumes
of patients to particular physicians, and they direct patients to physicians who will cooperate
with the health plan in reducing costs, particularly in reducing the utilization of health care
services. Thus, they confer preferred provider status on physicians who are willing to order
shorter hospital stays, make fewer referrals to specialists, and prescribe drugs and treatments
that are the least expensive alternatives. Physicians who are unwilling to follow these guidelines
are "deselected," the equivalent of termination. See Staudohar & Dworkin, supra note 108, at
199.
117. McKinlay, supra note 112, at 39-40.
118. Id. at 40.
119. DENNIS A. ROBBINS, INTEGRATING MANAGED CARE AND ETHICS: TRANSFORMING
CHALLENGES INTO POSITIVE OUTCOMES 3 (1998). A secondary rationale was to improve
medical service, particularly preventative care, early diagnosis, wellness programs, and patient
education to promote better self-care. See Peter D. Fox, An Overview of Managed Care, in
ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 3 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 2d ed. 1997).
120. In the focus on cost-cutting, there is little mention of the profitability of the health care
industry to the corporations and corporate executives who run the corporate bureaucracies.
Cost-cutting is focused exclusively on consumers and providers of services, rather than on
equipment, pharmaceuticals, and corporate owners. See GLAZER, supra note 4, at 117 (noting
profitability of corporate side of health care service delivery).
121. See Luepke, supra note 110, at 276-77.
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punished: the claims reviews are used to make future contracting and
staffing decisions vis-i-vis physicians.122
An important tool of ideological control is the "critical pathway."
The critical pathway is a total quality management system technique
that consists of a roadmap suggesting the course of treatment for any
patient in a hospital setting. 23 Once a diagnosis is made, the critical
pathway provides "a 'cookbook' approach to medicine.1' 24 It is suffi-
ciently detailed that deviations from it can be easily tracked and re-
corded,25 so that nonconforming careproviders may be identified and
brought into line; it is a direct medium by which hospitals may control
the day-to-day clinical decisions made by physicians.I26Alternatively,
physicians working in bureaucratic organizations find their diagnostic
work guided by "protocols," flow charts that dictate what decisions
will be made at each fork in the road during a diagnostic process.1 27
Critical pathways and protocols represent examples of the application
of scientific management to the medical profession. 2 8
The overall impact of bureaucratization on the practice of medi-
cine is also significant. Work is segmented and directed by adminis-
122. Id. at 277.
123. Karen A. Butler, Comment, Health Care Quality Revolution: Legal Landmines for
Hospitals and the Rise of the Critical Pathway, 58 ALB. L. REV. 843, 844-45 (1995).
124. Id.
125. The practice of monitoring physician treatment patterns and using statistical analysis to
identify and discipline those who deviate from the standardized care pattern is known as physi-
cian profiling or benchmarking. It can be used to identify over or under-utilization of services,
evaluate outcomes, and document variations in both quality of care and efficiency of practice.
See Edmund R. Becker & Kareen Hall, Physician Services in a Academic Neurology Depart-
ment: Using the Resource-Based Relative-Value Scale to Examine Physician Activities, 27 J.
HEALTH CARE FIN. 79 (2001). Individual physician profiles are compared with peer-practice-
based norms and significant deviations identified. Christine Ramsey et al., Performance-
Improvements Strategies Can Reduce Costs, 2001 HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL MGMT. RESOURCE
GUIDE 2, 4 (2000).
126. See Butler, supra note 123, at 845-46. While critical pathways could conceivably im-
prove the quality of medical care, not all pathways are developed by physicians, and the path-
ways are clearly implemented as a cost-saving measure. Id. at 861--64. One study found that
critical pathways were so successful at eliminating over-utilization of resources by physicians
that they reduced the mean cost per case by 35 percent, and the mean hospital stay decreased 27
percent as a result of implementation of the pathways. Ramsey et al., supra note 125, at 4.
127. Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 71.
128. Conceivably, a physician's job might be broken down into its parts (taking a medical
history, physical examination, ordering tests, forming a diagnosis, prescribing treatment, and
determining prognosis) and most if not all of these tasks assigned to subordinate workers or
performed by computer; biotechnology is far more efficient and reliable at both diagnosis and
treatment than most physicians, it appears. See McKinlay, supra note 112, at 52-54. "There have
also been studies showing that computers can perform nearly all aspects of diagnosis, treatment,
and therapy at a level of reliability higher than that of even the most highly-trained and up-to-
date physician." Id. at 54.
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trators rather than controlled by the practitioner, so that a physician
may not have either a vision of the ultimate ends of her action or
overall role in patient care. Pressure toward specialization, the dele-
gation of medical tasks to less skilled medical practitioners, and isola-
tion from patients who have come to view themselves as clients of the
institution rather than as patients of the doctor, all stem from thc
pressure toward cost containment and profit production in HMOs. 129
Technology is owned and controlled by the institution and its use
curtailed according to institutional goals. Physicians become depend-
ent upon allied health professionals for effective functioning in the
bureaucracy, as their practice is organized in a teamwork fashion. 30
As a member of the team rather than its captain, the physician in a
large bureaucracy or hospital setting is subject to hospital rules estab-
lished by administrators who are professionals themselves, but who
do not share the medical ethic of care. Health care management and
hospital administration training equip administrators with an ideology
of guarding scarce organizational resources rather than of providing
the highest quality medical care in any given case, and the technical
skills to justify their decisions curtailing the activities and practice of
physicians.131
2. Loss of Technical Control: Time and Standardization
In order to control costs, managed care organizations must con-
trol physicians' time and standardize their product.13 2 Accordingly, in
bureaucracies that employ physicians, working hours are established
129. See Staudohar & Dworkin, supra note 108, at 200-01.
130. McKinlay, supra note 112, at 55-56.
131. Id. at 56. Even those administrators who are recruited from the ranks of physicians
appear to shift priorities once in administration, adopting the organizational priorities of profit,
efficiency, and "fiscal responsibility" in preference to the prerogatives of medical care. Id. at 56.
132. One physician explained:
Because physicians are responsible for ordering up to 80% of all healthcare services, it
is obvious that.., a healthcare corporation... must control the physician. The most
benign method of controlling physicians is to put them on salary so that their income is
not influenced by or dependent on the number of tests or procedures they order. The
most malignant way to control physicians is to inversely associate their income with the
level of services they order. A capitated physician in U.S. Healthcare, the HMO of the
Aetna insurance company, has as much as 50% of his gross income at risk. One com-
ponent of his income is a bonus, which rewards the physician for meeting clinical and
marketing goals and achieving a high level of patient satisfaction. Another component
is punishment in the form of withheld income for ordering an "excessive" amount of
clinical services.
Kevin Loh, Professionalism, Where Are You?, 79 EAR, NOSE & THROAT J. 242, 243 (2000)
(footnotes omitted).
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by the organization rather than controlled by the physician.13  Admin-
istrators regulate directly the number of patients physicians see per
day, the number of minutes spent with each patient, the diagnostic
and treatment protocols that physicians follow, the tests they order,
and the forms of treatment they may offer. 134 Specific strategies used
by managed care systems to control physicians' behavior include re-
quiring preauthorization for some medical services, restricting access
of patients to specialists, denying payment for services provided out-
side the network, restricting payments for coverage on prescription
drugs, and tying bonuses to certain utilization levels. 135 Finally, physi-
cian performance can be linked to pay, so that advancement through
a pay range is based upon the physician's contribution to the practice
group, measured not only by clinical quality and patient satisfaction,
but also by use of resources. 136
3. Summary
It appears, then, that the revisionists were correct: the historical
autonomy of physicians was secured primarily by their strategic mo-
nopoly over knowledge, rather than by the actual possession of
knowledge. 37 As bureaucratization and advances in technology pro-
ceed, physicians are losing their collective monopoly over medical
knowledge and may be expected to become more and more proletari-
anized, just as craft workers did during the transition to an industrial
era. Thus, physicians can be replaced by workers who perform un-
skilled or semi-skilled work, or by technology, either of which can be
133. McKinlay, supra note 112, at 51.
134. Gordon, supra note 110.
135. See David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What's Wrong with a Patient Bill of
Rights?, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 229 (2000); John J. Deis, Comment, The Unionization of Inde-
pendent Contracting Physicians: A Comedy of Errors, 36 Hous. L. REV. 951, 954 (1999). In one
controversial case, a patient suffered a ruptured appendix because her physician delayed order-
ing an ultrasound test that would have disclosed the condition. When she discovered that her
HMO paid bonuses to doctors who ordered fewer diagnostic tests, she sued the treating physi-
cian and the HMO under ERISA, alleging that the bonus plan created a conflict of interest for
physicians, and thus represented a breach of fiduciary duty by the HMO. The Supreme Court
ruled that because mixed treatment and eligibility decisions by HMO doctors are not fiduciary
decisions under ERISA, the action failed to state a claim. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 221
(observing that "inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any HMO scheme, and
rationing necessarily raises some risks while reducing others," and declining to make social
policy judgments about the overall wisdom of managed care which are better left to the legisla-
ture).
136. See Stephanie B. Woodson, Making the Connection Between Physician Performance
and Pay, 53 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 39 (1999).
137. McKinlay, supra note 112, at 55.
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exploited more effectively by the bureaucratic organization. Alterna-
tively, physicians may suffer job consolidation, traditionally known as
"speed-up," as tasks once performed by less-skilled workers are
shifted to them in order to cut labor costs at the bottom of the pyra-
mid. 138 Either way, "their labor power will lose its value, and the privi-
leges physicians presently enjoy in conditions of work, social prestige,
and income will diminish, along with distinctions between them and
related medical care workers.' ' 39
B. Law
1. Private Law Firms
Law firms once assumed the form of partnerships, characterized
by professional values and a familial spirit. The modern market has
pressed them toward a large firm business model organized hierarchi-
cally.14 The rise of large corporations and the concentration of assets
and power in fewer corporate entities have had a spillover effect on
the legal profession. As lawyers undertake to serve large corporate
interests, they have institutionalized the tenets of mass production
that guide the clients whose interests they serve. 14' Efficiency and
productivity are believed to require bureaucratization and specializa-
tion of attorneys by subject matter.1 42 The modern firm is organized
138. Job consolidation has been used extensively in nursing. "Team nursing," as the array of
providers offering caregiving services to patients was called, has been replaced in some hospitals
with "primary care," in which RNs perform all tasks including direct care, allowing the em-
ployer to reduce therapy, clerical, and housekeeping staff. See GLAZER, supra note 4, at 146-49.
139. McKinlay, supra note 112, at 55.
140. S.S. Samuelson, The Organizational Structure of Law Firms: Lessons From Manage-
ment Theory, 51 OHIO. ST. L.J. 645,645-46 (1990).
141. See Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1934)
("The rise of big business has produced an inevitable specialization of the Bar. The successful
lawyer of our day more often than not is the proprietor or general manager of a new type of
factory, whose legal product is increasingly the result of mass production methods."); A.A.
Berle, Jr., Modern Legal Profession, 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 340, 344
(1933):
Intellectually the [legal] profession commanded and still commands respect, but it is
the respect for an intellectual jobber and contractor rather than for a moral force. The
leading lawyers, especially those who are the heads of the great law factories, must be
able to please or serve the large economic groups and they become therefore ex-
tremely skilled technicians.
142. Economies of scale (unit costs decline as volume of production rises), scope (many
clients need more than one type of legal specialist, and a large firm environment insures that the
client's interests can be served by a team of lawyers with varying specialties, or that the client
can be transferred from one lawyer to another with minimal loss of startup time), and specializa-
tion militate toward the large bureaucratically structured firm rather than the smaller, tradi-
tional partnership or sole proprietorship. Samuelson, supra note 140, at 647-48.
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vertically by rank and tenure.'43 When confronted by declining profits
in the recession of the 1980s and early 1990s, law firms behaved as
their clients did-they downsized, starting with associates at the bot-
tom of the firm hierarchy. In short, as Second Circuit Judge Irving
Kaufman observed, "the largest law firms have acquired the charac-
teristics of the corporations they have represented."'"1
The traditional partnership represented "the ultimate coopera-
tive organization, a marriage of equals" and was characterized by
equality in management and profit-sharing among the equity part-
ners. 145 By contrast, the large law firm concentrates power and control
in a relatively small number of partners who make decisions with lit-
tle or no input from the other partners in the firm. An executive
committee dominated by a select cadre of senior partners typically
exercises ideological control over the firm's work, determining con-
tent of the firm's work, the firm's growth rate, and performance stan-
dards for associates.146 A managing partner or partners exerts ultimate
control. 47 Rules, procedures, annual performance reviews, and bo-
nuses tied to billable hours or positive performance serve as the en-
forcement tools for maintaining technical control.148 Associates are
provided with every incentive to identify with management, rather
than with labor. Conflict with management is muted; constraints on
autonomy are perceived as arising from the client.
149
Inevitably, lawyers sacrifice autonomy to the larger goals of the
bureaucratic law firm. 50 By far the most significant tool of technical
discipline that large firms exercise over lawyers is the billable hour.
The need to measure lawyer output, and the difficulties in valuing
intangible legal services, have resulted in heavy reliance on the bill-
able hour.' Billable hour requirements have increased dramatically
143. Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 77.
144. Irving R. Kaufman, Broken Contracts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1990, at A17 (emphasis
added).
145. Samuelson, supra note 140, at 650.
146. Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 77.
147. Samuelson, supra note 140, at 652.
148. See Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 77.
149. Id. at 79-80. Corporate clients of large law firms sometimes do impose specific limita-
tions on the work attorneys may do, including how much they may bill, how many research
hours they may work, how many client contacts they may make, etc. This is increasingly com-
mon in the insurance defense industry.
150. Samuelson, supra note 140, at 674.
151. See id. at 647; see generally WINNING ALTERNATIVES TO THE BILLABLE HOUR:
STRATEGIES THAT WORK xiii-xiv (James A. Calloway & Mark A. Robertson, eds., 2d ed. 2002)
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over the past half-century, moving from 1100 hours per year in 1950
to 1900 hours per year in 2000.152 At some firms, additional compensa-
tion is explicitly tied to billing hours over and above the threshold
level required of all associates: so-called "sweat bonuses," "productiv-
ity bonuses," or optional "higher hour" salary tracks reflect these
arrangements. 153
Past ABA president Robert Hirshon recently pressed the ques-
tion of why the value of legal services must be measured exclusively
in terms of hours, asking pointedly, "As lawyers, do we sell our time
or our skill?"154 He observed that reducing lawyering to increments of
time saps the creativity from lawyering and squeezes out other as-
pects of lawyering as a profession, such as pro bono service to the
community. 155 Moreover, it is not clear that hourly billing is the most
effective business valuation method. If lawyer output is measured
exclusively in terms of hours, some unintended consequences follow:
inefficiency may be rewarded, 156 improvements in technology that
allow re-use and tailoring of an attorney's or firm's prior work prod-
uct will not be recognized or their costs recaptured,'57 training and
[hereinafter ALTERNATIVES TO THE BILLABLE HOUR] (suggesting that hourly billing became
the norm because it is perceived as unambiguous, objective, and easy to measure).
It is not clear that other valuation methods necessarily avoid the evils of standardiza-
tion. For example, total quality management, which would require measuring the value ofparticular services performed by lawyers, is rejected by many because it assumes that legal
services can be standardized. Deborah K. Holmes, Learning from Corporate America: Address-ing Dysfunstion in the Large Law Firm, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 373, 395-96 (1996); see also G.
Howland Blackiston, A Road Map for Quality in Legal Services, 43 EMORY L.J. 507, 509-10
(1994).
152. Martha Neil, Off To A Running Start: Hirshon Announces Initiatives on Billable Hours
and Student Loans, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2001, at 82. These figures are minimums only; it is common
at many firms for associates seeking partnership to bill hours considerably in excess of that-as
many as 2500 per year or more would not be surprising. Id.
153. In the year 2000, Covington & Burling paid new associates $125,000 per year for base-line billings of 1950 hours per year. For associates who billed 2000 hours, it offered an $8,500
minimum bonus. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe offered a $25,000 sweat bonus for those billing2400 hours. Hogan & Hartson in Washington D.C. created two salary tracks: $110,000 for 1800billable hours and $125,000 for 1950 billable hours. Ted Allen, Who Wants to Earn $160,000 a
Year?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 13, 2000, at 18.
154. Robert E. Hirshon, Law and the Billable Hour: A Standard Developed in the 1960s May
Be Damaging our Profession, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2002, at 10.
155. See id. Reliance on hourly billing as a system for measuring output, taken in combina-
tion with increases in billable hour requirements, also squeezes out other aspects of life-most
significantly family life and parenting. Utilizing time worked as an indicator of commitment to
the firm, as well as the sole measure of productivity and often merit as well, impacts working
parents disproportionately and blocks work/family innovations that offer the potential to im-prove both morale and productivity. See Marion Crain, "Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?":
Marriage and Breadwinning in Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1877, 1950-51 (1999).
156. See Holmes, supra note 151, at 388-89; Crain, supra note 155, at 1950 n.318.
157. See ALTERNATIVES TO THE BILLABLE HOUR, supra note 151, at xv.
[Vol179:543
2004] THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL WORKFORCE 573
mentoring are treated as luxuries that cannot be recaptured in client
fees and thus are disincentivized, 158 and efficiency stemming from
experience is not recognized beyond certain limits.1 59 At bottom, the
relationship between the value of the services received and the fee
charged is questionable. 60 Nonetheless, the billable hour remains the
industry standard for large law firms.
Pressure on the billable hour and the significance of quantity of
hours worked was intensified by the trend, led by Cravath, Swaine &
Moore in the 1980s, to raise salaries of first year associates to un-
precedented levels, a move soon followed by other large law firms
across the nation.1 61 This shift, which Gordon calls "one of the most
antisocial acts of the bar in recent history,"
devalues public service by widening the gulf.., between starting
salaries in private practice and in government and public interest
law. It drives impressionable young associates toward consumption
patterns and expectations of opulence that will be hard to shake off
if they want to change careers. It forces every lawyer in the firm,
especially the associates who are its supposed beneficiaries, to pay
heavily for it in extra billable hours and, insofar as high incomes for
the partners depend upon low partner-associate ratios, in reduced
prospects of reaching partnership. 162
Alarmed by the market-driven increases in salary for beginning
attorneys, 163 a number of large law firms have taken further steps to
narrow the professional role, restructuring the way work (and profits)
are allocated. Some firms are shifting work to contract or staff attor-
neys, who are paid much less than partner-track associates and bill at
a lower rate, or to nonlawyer professionals like paralegals.IM Other
firms use "attorney advisors" to substitute for attorneys; these per-
sons have backgrounds in technology or economics, and can do part
of the job the firm has been hired to perform, but at a lower cost165
158. See Holmes, supra note 151, at 389.
159. ALTERNATIVES TO THE BILLABLE HOUR, supra note 151, at xv (noting that the market
will not always bear upward hourly rate adjustments to take account of attorney expertise).
160. See id. at 129.
161. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 60 (1988).
162. Id.
163. The median first year associate salary in April 2002 was $90,000 among more than 600
law firms surveyed nationwide, with a range of $53,000 at firms with twenty-five or fewer attor-
neys to $118,000 for those with more than 500 attorneys. In addition, some firms distributed
bonuses of $25,000 (down from $40,000 two years previously) to junior associates. Martha Neil,
What Goes Up... Starting Associate Salaries Are Flat for Now, and the Future Is Uncertain,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 2003, at 24.
164. See Michael Orey, Law Firms Ponder Major Changes to Fund Leap in Starting Salaries,
WALL ST. J., May 12,2000, at B1.
165. See id.
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All of these strategies are profit-maximizing moves that reflect the
use of scientific management or bureaucratization to divide the pro-
fessional work into its component parts.
The dramatic bureaucratization of the modern law firm has re-
sulted in a bewildering array of attorney statuses that range far be-
yond the traditional partner/associate dichotomy.166 "Permanent
associates," "non-equity partners," attorneys who are "of counsel,"
and "junior partners" now work alongside contract lawyers and legal
temps. 167 The legal significance of these various statuses is now com-
ing to the attention of the federal courts. In 1999, Sidley & Austin
demoted thirty-two partners (who were primarily in their mid-fifties
and early sixties) to "counsel" or "senior counsel" status as part of an
operational restructuring designed to improve profitability.168 At the
same time, it changed its mandatory retirement age from sixty-five to
a sliding scale of sixty to sixty-five. Both decisions were made by the
firm's thirty-six-member executive committee; the firm's remaining
377 partners were not permitted to vote on the question. 169
The EEOC initiated an investigation under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act ("ADEA"), arguing that the move was part
of a strategy to push older attorneys out of the firm in order to make
room for younger partners and associates who were more productive.
Sidley & Austin responded that the EEOC lacked jurisdiction over
the partners because they were not "employees" covered by the
ADEA's antidiscrimination protections. The U.S. District Court
granted the EEOC's request to subpoena partnership records, order-
ing the firm to turn over employment records for the thirty-two for-
mer partners, including compensation records and information about
their capital accounts, which were necessary in order to ascertain
whether the EEOC had jurisdiction (i.e., whether the partners were
"employees"), and whether discrimination had occurred.1 0 Judge
Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, vacated and remanded the
case with instructions to order Sidley to comply fully with the portion
166. See Samuelson, supra note 140, at 656.
167. Id.
168. The firm's rationale for the demotions was that the demoted partners' contributions
were "less than expected." T. Shawn Taylor, 'Partners' Put Law Firms in Labor Bind: EEOC,
Chicago Firm do Battle, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 2002, at C1.
169. In May of 2002, Sidley & Austin merged with Brown & Wood, and has increased its
staff of more than 900 attorneys worldwide to more than 1,325 attorneys. Michael Bologna,
Federal Judge Grants EEOC Subpoena of Chicago Law Firm's Partnership Records, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 30, Feb. 13, 2002, at A-7.
170. EEOC v. Sidley & Austin, 88 FEP Cases 64 (N.D. I11. 2002).
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of the subpoena that requests documents necessary to determine cov-
erage, and therefore jurisdiction; and then to make a determination
upon completion of the document submissions whether the demoted
partners were arguably covered by the ADEA.1
71
The court's opinion did not settle the question whether the
thirty-two demoted partners were employees for the purposes of cov-
erage under the ADEA. Nonetheless, the court did agree with the
EEOC that the partners' classification as partners "under state law is
not dispositive of their status under federal antidiscrimination law.""17
That the federal courts are now engaged in determining the status of
workers at the upper end of the employment spectrum for purposes
of conferring protection rather than liability under labor and em-
171. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 707 (7th Cir 2002). In the event
the court finds coverage arguable, further compliance with the subpoena would be required on
the portions of the materials requested that relate to the merits of the claim. Id.
172. Id. at 702. Whether the partners are employees for purposes of antidiscrimination law
turns largely on whether they are NOT employers, who are not protected under the antidis-
crimination statutes. Neither the partners' share in the profits of the firm, ability to bind the firm
through opinion letters, their ownership of some part of the firm's capital, or their liability for
debts of the practice were sufficient to categorically define them as employers rather than em-
ployees. Because the partners do not elect the members of the executive committee, they cannot
be said to have delegated their decisionmaking powers to the executive committee. The court
concluded,
What the Commission particularly wants to know is how unevenly the profits are
spread across the entire firm. Are profits so concentrated in members of the execu-
tive committee ... that the [32 demoted partners] occupied the same position they
would have if they had been working at a comparable rank for one of the investment
banks that once were partnerships but now are corporations? This might not be deci-
sive but it would bear on the unavoidably multifactored determination of whether
this large law firm-which in recognition that conventional partnership is designed
for much smaller and simpler firms has contractually altered the structure of the firm
in the direction of the corporate form-should for purposes of antidiscrimination law
be deemed the employer of some at least of the individuals whom it designates as
partners.
Id. at 707. A case raising related issues was recently decided by the Supreme Court. In Clacka-
mas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003), the Court ruled that the
EEOC's six-point test for determining who is an "employee" was appropriate for application to
the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), which utilizes the same definition of "em-
ployee" as do the ADEA and Title VII. The Court noted that the professional corporation is a
"new type of business entity that has no exact precedent in common law," but went on to ob-
serve that the traditional inquiry into the extent of the employer's right to control the servant's
work used in other contexts should serve as the "principal guidepost" in determining whether a
physician-shareholder in a medical practice is an "employee" for purposes of ADA applicabil-
ity. Id. at 1679. The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to apply the EEOC's test and
rule on whether the physician-shareholders in the medical practice were "employees." The
EEOC test focuses on whether the organization hires, fires and sets rules and regulations gov-
erning the individual's work; whether and to what extent the organization supervises the indi-
vidual's work; whether the individual reports to a higher level person in the organization;
whether and to what extent the individual has influence over the organization; the parties'
intent as to the employee status of the individual, evidenced by written agreements; and
whether the individual shares in profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization. Id. at 1680-81.
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ployment legislation evidences professionals' vulnerability to profit-
maximizing strategies such as scientific management and bureaucrati-
zation.
2. In-House Counsel
In-house counsel face even greater bureaucratization than do at-
torneys in large law firms. The jobs are less prestigious and entail
more routine assignments; the most challenging and creative legal
work is contracted out to specialists at law firms.173 In-house counsel
lack any ideological control over their work; unlike associates in large
law firms, they cannot even use the criterion of profitability to argue
for change. 114
3. Government Attorneys
Undoubtedly the most starkly bureaucratized work settings for
lawyers are government offices. The minutely detailed job descrip-
tions, "GS" ranking systems which determine salary, and relatively
routine promotions based upon seniority that characterize govern-
ment employment combine with the forced specialization and highly
technical work of most government lawyers to produce a workforce
that is subject to both ideological and technical control. 175
4. Legal Services Attorneys
Lawyers who serve the poor are perhaps the most visibly dissatis-
fied of all lawyers, at least as measured by unionization rates. Legal
services provides an especially compelling example of the efficacy of
bureaucratic control mechanisms in shaping the ideological content of
professional work.'76 Moreover, the paucity of social resources dedi-
cated to providing legal assistance to the poor has forced legal ser-
vices lawyers to create self-help packets for client use when
underfunded Legal Aid offices cannot take their cases. In so doing,
173. Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 83.
174. Compare id. at 77-78, 80 (describing universal profit motive which guides law firm
decisionmaking) with id. at 86 (describing muted voice of in-house counsel in corporate deci-
sionmaking).
175. See id. at 87-88.
176. Id. at 73; see Deborah M. Weissman, Law As Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for
the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 737 (2002) (discussing history of political and legislative
restrictions imposed on the legal work that legal services lawyers may perform).
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they are forced to Taylorize their own work, standardizing their work
and separating themselves from their products.
77
5. Law Professors
Even legal academics have been impacted by the trend toward
control of time and product standardization. A senior colleague advis-
ing junior colleagues about the character of scholarly work most
likely to yield significant raises or chairs summarized it this way:
"deans can count." By this he meant that while deans might hesitate
to pass judgment on the quality of one faculty member's scholarship
over another's work at raise time, many are quite willing to rest deci-
sions on volume of scholarship produced. Similarly, Professor Ian
Ayres recently advised new law professors seeking tenure to publish
two articles per year timed to coincide with the article "sweeps" peri-
ods in major law reviews (fall and spring); this quantitative level of
production, he asserted, was "guaranteed" to earn tenure. 178 Professor
Ayres sought to "demystify" the production of scholarship by outlin-
ing a production schedule aimed at meeting this goal. He advised as-
piring academics to draft 1000 words per day (four words per minute
during a four hour writing block per day) for twenty-five to thirty
days, which should yield a 25,000-30,000 word article, the norm for
publication in most major reviews.179
6. Summary
The increasing emphasis in the practice of law on specialization
and standardization of products, as well as the allegiance to the bill-
able hour or other quantitative measures of the value of services, fur-
nishes powerful evidence that lawyers have yielded ideological and
technical control over their work to employers. Whether the em-
ployer is a large law partnership, a corporate employer, the govern-
ment, a legal services corporation, or an educational institution, the
lawyer who cedes autonomy over the ideological ends to which her
work is put, her labor process, and her time itself loses the autonomy
that has been central to the definition of the lawyer as a professional.
She becomes vulnerable to profit-maximizing strategies that divide
177. Spangler & Lehman, supra note 20, at 93.
178. Ian Ayres, Developing A Scholarly Agenda, Presentation Before the New Law Teach-
ers' Workshop, Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Jan. 2003, in
Washington, D.C. [audiotape on file with author].
179. Id.
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her work into its component parts and sub-contract out significant
aspects to less-skilled, non-professional, cheaper workers, or corn-
modify it for purposes of distributing it more efficiently through
economies of scale.
IV. UNIONS FOR PROFESSIONALS? ORGANIZING DOCTORS AND
LAWYERS
It appears, then, that the revisionists were correct in their predic-
tions about the working futures of professionals: they are moving
steadily toward commodification. Professionals' resistance to the
commodification process can be measured by the depth of their anger
and sense of betrayal at the breach of the social bargain and the de-
nial of privileges to which they believed themselves entitled on the
basis of their extended professional education and elevated class
status. 10 Research suggests that rising expectations, fostered by an
ideology of self-interest and unlimited individual mobility, eventually
coalesce as an assertion of a right to meaningful and remunerative
work, particularly by the highly educated workforce.S Charles Der-
ber has posited that highly entitled workers (such as professionals)
are more likely to externalize blame for failure to achieve onto em-
ployers and society. 182 Ultimately, he suggests, they may furnish "an
especially fertile base for the growth of social dissent. ' ' 183 But how
180. Charles Derber, Unemployment and the Entitled Worker: Job-Entitlement and Radical
Political Attitudes Among the Youthful Unemployed, 26 SOC. PROB. 26, 27 (1978).
181. See id. at 26-27. Many professionals are not even inclined to trade off intrinsic rewards
of work for extrinsic rewards such as higher pay; they feel strongly that both ample remunera-
tion and interesting and challenging work are their due as professionals. Id. at 27-28.
182. Id. at 28. Derber's 1970s study of unemployed workers under thirty-five years of age
collecting unemployment insurance in a suburb of Boston revealed no significant difference in
job entitlement perceptions between college-graduates and non-college graduates. Three-
quarters of the workers in his sample expressed high beliefs in job entitlement, regardless of
educational background. Id. at 30-31. Thus, while education is one source of entitlement beliefs,
it appears that it is not the only source. Derber concludes that a new, universal expectation of
entitlement is emerging that is divorced from individual achievement and is accepted by work-
ers at lower skill levels. Those who are highly educated and skilled appear more likely to attrib-
ute their job entitlement to personal achievement, however. He concludes:
[T]hese attitudinal differences between the more educated and less educated workers
are generally consistent with their respective class interests. The preliminary indica-
tion is that the highly educated, more privileged worker, while largely supportive of
the new universalistic ideology of entitlement, persists in asserting entitlement-claims
on the basis of personal accomplishments as well. This adherence to individualistic
ideology is deeply ingrained in the middle classes and legitimates class privilege.
Id. at 31.
183. Charles Derber, Underemployment and the American Dream: "Underemployment-
Consciousness" and Radicalism Among Young Workers, 49 SOCIOL. INQUIRY 37, 43 (1979)
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likely is it that professionals' outrage over diminishing status will find
expression in unionism?
A. Shifting Tides
At first blush, professionals' traditional strong commitment to an
individualist ethos would appear to make them unlikely candidates
for a collectivist strategy.T 4 Professionals' working conditions were
historically organized around an ideology of individualism: individual-
ized work, individualized clients, and individual specialization of func-
tion.' Nonetheless, professionals have always been joiners, working
collectively through professional associations to maintain their mar-
ket monopoly (through furthering professional education, conducting
peer review, and maintaining and refining licensing and certification
standards). Indeed, the very existence of professions is actually the
"collective assertion of special social status and ... a collective proc-
ess of upward social mobility.11 8 6 Professionals are thus accustomed to
the role of collective organization and self-governance, and look to
professional associations to establish, maintain, and enhance profes-
sional identity, as well as for information, education, and professional
development opportunities.17 Accordingly, when the professional
associations began to respond to the tendency of corporate employers
to commodify the professions by endorsing unionization and collec-
tive bargaining, the stage was set for change. The American Associa-
tion of Administrative Law Judges, the American Pharmaceutical
Association, The American Medical Association, the American
Nurses' Association, the American Federation of Teachers, and the
National Education Association have all adopted a posture support-
ing unionization and collective bargaining, and are in various stages
of a transition to becoming more like unions themselves.
Increasingly, professionals are organizing in response to em-
ployer efforts to circumscribe discretionary power, to control how
(finding support for the underemployment thesis in a study that revealed a correlation between
underemployment-consciousness and radical political views).
184. Derber, supra note 180, at 29.
185. LARSON, supra note 27, at 236-37.
186. Id. at xvi. Larson explains that professionals translate scarce cultural resources (exper-
tise, skill) into social and economic rewards, and then maintain the scarcity of resources (knowl-
edge) via a monopoly power over the market for their expertise. Id. at xvii.
187. Hurd, supra note 61, at 3 (suggesting that if unions could adopt some of the characteris-
tics of professional associations-such as an information and education-intensive focus, they
might attract a larger percentage of professional workers).
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particular tasks are performed, or to reduce the exercise of profes-
sional judgment. They seek voice and input in decisionmaking, par-
ticularly about professional objectives, and to regain the societal
respect, prestige, and dignity they once enjoyed as part of their pro-
fessional status.1 8 The paradigm professions of medicine and law evi-
dence this phenomenon well, and I turn to them as illustrations.
B. Physicians
By 1999, 42,000 of the 620,000 doctors nationwide were organ-
ized. 189 There are three major established physicians' unions and one
housestaff union. The first doctors' union, the Committee on Interns
and Residents ("CIR"), was formed in 1957.190 By 1999 it boasted
9000 members and had affiliated with the Service Employees' Inter-
national Union ("SEIU"). 9' The largest physicians' union, the Union
of American Physicians and Dentists ("UAPD"), began organizing
doctors in 1972 in the San Francisco area. 19 By 2000, it had a mem-
bership of 6000 -all postresidents. 193 The UAPD further strengthened
its market share of physician representation when it affiliated with the
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
("AFSCME"). 194 The Federation of Physicians and Dentists ("FPD"),
established in Tallahassee in 1983, is also affiliated with AFSCME.195
A third founding doctors' union was the Doctors' Council, founded in
New York City in 1959; it merged with two other unions in 1999 to
form the Doctors Alliance in New York, and affiliated with the SEIU
188. See Charles B. Craver, Why Labor Unions Must [and Can] Survive, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 15, 44-46 (1998); Liebowitz, supra note 111, at 32; see also Hurd, supra note 61, at 1-3
(noting that freedom to exercise professional judgment lies at the top of the list of organizing
issues). The charter of the UAPD exemplifies the goals of a professional organization in the
medical context. The UAPD charter strives
to provide optimum medical care for people; to insure quality facilities for the provi-
sions of medical care; to enable doctors to give of themselves, unhindered by extrane-
ous forces, for the welfare of their patients; to insure reasonable compensation for
doctors commensurate with their training, skill, and the responsibility they bear for the
life and health of their fellow beings.
BUDRYS, supra note 26, at 9 (quoting preamble to UAPD charter).
189. Valliere, supra note 6.
190. Staudohar & Dworkin, supra note 108, at 205.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Valliere, supra note 6; Jeremy Lutsky, Is Your Physician Becoming a Teamster: The
Rising Trend of Physicians Joining Labor Unions in the Late 1990s, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 55, 99 (1997).
195. Valliere, supra note 6.
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that same year. 96 In 1999, the AMA endorsed physician unionization
and created its own union, Physicians for Responsible Negotiation
("PRN") (which has disavowed strikes as a method for increasing
bargaining leverage). 97 The number of doctors estimated to belong to
one of the major unions was approaching 50,000 by the year 2000.198
Much of the earliest doctor organizing was focused on the prob-
lem of deteriorating patient access and services, particularly in non-
profit clinics and hospitals located in areas that serve low-income
residents.199 Threats to professional autonomy surfaced when third
party players began to dictate standards of care. Physician organizing
received a significant boost in the 1970s with the advent of Medicare
and the limitations it imposed on treatment through its coverage,
which indirectly impacted physician autonomy. Similarly, the phe-
nomenon of managed care and the control that HMOs and third
party payor insurance companies seek to exercise over doctors'
treatment decisions prompted the newest wave of physician organiz-
ing in the 1990s, and was certainly responsible for the PRN's entry
onto the scene.2°°
The primary organizing impetus today thus stems from the loss
of professional autonomy and the right to determine treatment and
control over patient care service delivery; salary and benefit issues are
secondary and reflect the loss of public respect and prestige.2'By con-
trolling physicians' time and limiting their authority to diagnose and
treat patients and to refer them to specialists, HMOs have commodi-
fied physicians. As one physician-unionist described it, "[Blue
Cross/Blue Shield] wanted to pretend that we were no more impor-
196. Id.; Staudohar & Dworkin, supra note 108, at 205; Liebowitz, supra note 111, at 28. The
Doctors' Council affiliated with the SEIU in 1999. Id. at 29.
197. Staudohar & Dworkin, supra note 108, at 206. Subsequent to the Court's decision in
Kentucky River, see infra notes 314-20 and accompanying text, the AMA announced that it
would no longer seek to organize private sector physician employees through PRN because of
the now-unfavorable legal climate, but indicated that it would continue to represent those
already organized and that it would monitor legal developments in the private sector, with the
intention of recommencing its organizing efforts there when the legal climate becomes more
hospitable. See High Court Ruling Causes PRN to End Organizing Efforts for Private Sector
Doctors, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 111, June 8, 2001, at A-6.
198. Staudohar & Dworkin, supra note 108, at 206.
199. Liebowitz, supra note 111, at 28.
200. Staudohar & Dworkin, supra note 108, at 199, 206.
201. Liebowitz, supra note 111, at 32, 34. See, e.g., Physicians At Tucson Medical Clinic Vote
for Representation by AFSCME Affiliate, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) NO. 16, Jan. 24, 1997, at A-5
(noting that the major issue in the organizing drive, conducted by the Federation of Physicians
and Dentists, was doctors' professional autonomy in making patient care decisions).
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tant than the tables and chairs in the health centers, that we could be
bought and sold. 202
Some have suggested that there is an ethical conflict created
when physicians unionize because promotion of self-interest conflicts
with their professional obligation to represent the interests of their
patients and to act as guardians of public health. Advocates of unioni-
zation, however, point out that other employees charged with protect-
ing the public are unionized without apparent conflict. 2 3 Two obvious
examples are firefighters and the police force. It is possible for worker
self-interest and advocacy on behalf of the public to coexist, even to
coincide.204
Moreover, while protection of third party interests is a likely by-
product of physician unionization,205 the assertion of patient rights is
not necessarily altruistic. Instead, promoting patient interests is a
critical aspect of professional identity and a central feature of the
social bargain that undergirds professionalism and secures privileged
class status.2 6 Accordingly, key goals at the bargaining table today-
202. Lutsky, supra note 194, at 89 (quoting Mary Chris Jaklevic, Physicians Find Power in
Unions: A Small But Growing Number of Docs Are Using Organized Labor to Gain Economic
Advantage, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Oct. 6, 1997, at 99).
203. See Id. at 92.
204. Id. at 100. See also Joseph Slater, Homeland Security vs. Workers' Rights? What the
Federal Government Should Learn From History and Experience, and Why, 6.2 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 85-86, on file with author) (discussing bravery of
unionized police and firefighters during 9/11 crisis and observing that union work rules did not
undermine their professionalism and performance under stress).
205. In Boston Medical Center, see infra note 221, for example, the housestaff sought to
obtain "adequate translators for their non-English speaking patients." Eva M. Panchyshyn,
Comment, Medical Resident Unionization: Collective Bargaining by Non-Employees for Better
Patient Care, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 111, 112 (1998).
206. Quality of patient care issues are undeniably implicated in physician organizing. The
American College of Physicians' Ethics Manual specifically notes that professional status carries
with it the obligation for physicians to be responsible to society for their professional actions,
which includes an obligation to "participate in decisions [concerning resource allocation as it
relates to patient health] at the policy level." See American College of Physicians, Ethics Man-
ual, Fourth Edition, 128 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 576 (1998), available at
www.acponline.org/journals/annals/lapr98/ethicman.htm._The AMA argues that physician
unionization is important in order to afford physicians "the leverage they now lack to guarantee
that patient care is not compromised or neglected for the sake of profits." Steven Greenhouse,
A.M.A. 's Delegates Vote to Unionize, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at Al. The AMA, which has
resolved that doctors who join the PRN will not strike, adheres to the ethical canon that doctors
"should not participate in a strike that adversely affects access to health care." See Ethics Man-
ual, supra.
Others are more cynical about the reasons why doctors are organizing, arguing that
they are responding primarily to a loss of prestige, power, and income, rather than in an effort
to assert patients' rights. See Greenhouse, supra (noting comments by professor of health care
policy to that effect); John J. Deis, Comment, The Unionization of Independent Contracting
Physicians: A Comedy of Errors, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 951 (1999) (arguing that physician unioniza-
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control over amount of time spent with each patient, autonomy to
make clinical decisions, elimination of "gag" clauses preventing doc-
tors from fully explaining medical treatment options to patients (par-
ticularly those that fall outside the health plan's coverage), ability to
prescribe drugs that are not on an insurer's table of covered drugs,
and the discretion to refer patients to specialists - 201 evidence physi-
cians' efforts to reclaim professional identity, not to assert patient
rights on patients' behalf.208
It is also clear that protection of class privilege and professional
status is itself a goal of many physician organizing drives. This is most
easily seen at the margins of the profession. The assignment of rou-
tine duties thought to be outside the sphere of professional skills
prompted residents and interns at Montefiore Medical Center in New
York to unionize. Cost-cutting measures implemented by the hospital
in order to remain financially viable fell disproportionately on interns
and residents, provoking anger and resentment, which crystallized
into an organizing drive by the Committee of Interns and Residents.
The drive was not triggered by a demand for additional wages (in-
terns and residents earn between $43,000 and $50,000 per year), but
by the impact of staff cuts on those at the bottom of the physician
hierarchy. As one resident explained, "To have to answer the phones,
to have to draw the bloods, to have to wheel the patients to X-ray
ourselves, that is not the best use of our time and our resources....
tion is a poor vehicle for protecting consumers' interests because it leaves the "fox guarding the
henhouse").
207. See Valliere, supra note 6; Liebowitz, supra note 111, at 36; Deis, supra note 206, at 969.
208. To the extent that physician organizing can be recast as the self-interested promotion of
professional identity and privilege, it is ironically more likely to be promoted effectively by the
collective bargaining process than were it done solely in the interests of patient care quality. The
labor law mandates bargaining over issues pertaining to the interests of third parties only where
such interests "vitally affect the terms and conditions of employment" of the employees on
whose behalf the bargaining is done. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); see also Deis, supra note 206, at 977-78; Michael J. Stapp, Ten
Years After: A Legal Framework of Collective Bargaining in the Hospital Industry, 2 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 63, 99-100 (1984) (noting that whether patient care issues are mandatory subjects of
bargaining is questionable); Rabban, supra note 14, at 707 (staffing and equipment levels as well
as standards of patient care in hospitals may be nonmandatory subjects of bargaining). Further,
because employers retain managerial prerogative to control the "scope and direction of the
enterprise," decisions regarding how the service or product will be constituted, how it will be
delivered, and so on need not be bargained over unless they directly impact terms and condi-
tions of employment. See First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677-79 (1981). Thus a
union may be able to compel bargaining over some, but not all, patient care issues under exist-
ing labor law. See Deis, supra note 206, at 969-83 (analyzing medical topics under traditional
NLRA mandatory/permissive subjects of bargaining framework). Recharacterizing these pa-
tient care issues as self-interested issues concerning professional identity and affecting profes-
sionals' conditions of employment is critical to their amenability to collective bargaining.
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That's time not spent on patient care." 10 9 Another resident explained
that the professional responsibility of doctors for patient care places
interns and residents in a Catch-22: "[W]e've got residents changing
bedpans, which prevents us from seeing more patients. The doctor is
ultimately responsible, [both] medically and legally. We aren't going
to allow these chores not to get done, even if that means doing them
ourselves.'"210
Some unions have led efforts to address quality of patient care is-
sues through legislation establishing rights for health care workers
rather than through collective bargaining. These too are efforts to
reclaim professional identity and status, albeit cast in the politically
palatable language of patient rights to adequate care. For example,
under pressure from nursing unions, New York enacted a Whistle-
blower Protection bill that prohibits retaliatory action against health
care workers who disclose or threaten to disclose information to a
supervisor or public body concerning instances of substandard patient
care.211 Similarly, professional organizations and labor unions have
sought to address some of the worst employer exploitation of health
care professionals through minimum standards legislation geared to
the health care industry, but premised the legislation on a rationale of
patient protection: overtired residents and nursing staff may jeopard-
ize patient health and safety. For example, the AMA has established
guidelines limiting working hours of residents,212 and several states
have enacted bills banning mandatory overtime for nurses in hospitals
except in emergency situations;213 similar proposals have been urged
209. Richard Perez-Pena, Union Drive at Montefiore Could Be Labor Landmark, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at F1.
210. Id.
211. See Pataki Signs Whistleblower Protection Act For Health Care Workers Who Cite Poor
Care, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 65, Apr. 4, 2002, at A-7. The statute creates a private right
of action and prescribes a civil penalty of up to $10,000 against employers who act in bad faith.
Penalties recovered are deposited in a statewide patient care improvement fund. Id.
212. See Thorn Wilder, AMA Establishes Guidelines on Resident Physician Working Hours,
Conditions, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 120, June 21, 2002, at A-5. In addition, residents have
challenged the matching system through which they are placed in residencies by the Association
of American Medical Colleges. The residents contend that the matching system amounts to a
conspiracy to depress and standardize residents' salaries in violation of the antitrust laws. See
Jung v. Ass'n. of Am. Med. Coils., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, (D.D.C. 2004), reported in Federal Court
Decides Residents' Lawsuit Against Matching Program May Proceed, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA)
No. 30, Feb. 17, 2004, at A-1.
213. Lorraine McCarthy, New Jersey Governor Signs Measure Banning Mandatory Overtime
in Hospitals, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 2, Jan. 3, 2002, at A-8 (making "it a violation of New
Jersey Wage and Hour Law to require an hourly employee involved in direct patient care or
clinical services to accept" regularly scheduled work of more than forty hours per week; the bill
excludes physicians); Nan Netherton, Governor Signs Bill to Prohibit Mandatory Overtime for
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at the federal level.214 California was the first state to enact legislation
establishing mandatory staffing ratios at nursing homes", and hospi-
tals. 216
The challenge to physician autonomy and to the self-image of
physicians as guardians of the public health is such a fundamental
blow to physician identity that "more than one-third of surveyed phy-
sicians characterized their morale as low," and almost one-half indi-
cated that they had considered changing careers. 17 Nonetheless, many
doctors remain ambivalent about affiliating with unions because they
Nurses, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 57, Mar. 25, 2002, at A-2 (describing Washington state
bill prohibiting mandatory overtime work for nurses, and prescribing fines of $1,000 per viola-
tion with additional penalties imposed on repeat violators). New York also limits the numbers
of hours residents may work, although teaching hospitals routinely violate the legislation. See
New York Study Says Most Teaching Hospitals in Violation of Residency Working Hour Limits,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 125, June 28, 2002, at A-7 (finding that 66 percent of the teaching
hospitals inspected by the New York state Health Department were in violation of the law,
which limits resident working hours to no more than eighty hours per week averaged over a
four-week period, and prescribes penalties of $6,000 per violation and additional fines for re-
peated violations).
214. See Bipartisan Measure Would Limit Mandatory Overtime for Most Nurses, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 30, Feb. 13, 2003, at A-4 (noting reintroduction in both House and Sen-
ate of The Safe Nursing and Patient Care Act of 2003, which seeks to limit mandatory overtime
for nurses to stem the exit of nurses from the profession and to minimize dangers for patients
created by overtired nursing staff); Unions, Congressman Urge Action on Bill That Would Ban
Forced Overtime for Nurses, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 233, Dec. 6, 2001, at A-5 (discussing
Safe Nursing and Patient Care Act of 2001, H.R. 3238, introduced in November of 2001 by Rep.
Fortney Stark and supported by the American Federation of Teachers, the American Nurses
Association, AFSCME, AFGE, SEIU, UAW, and the AFL-CIO); Bills Would Limit Mandatory
Overtime for Nurses, Reduce Hours for Residents, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 215, Nov. 8,
2001, at A-7 (discussing The Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 3235,
introduced by Rep. John Conyers, which seeks to place limits on the number of hours interns
and residents could work).
215. See California Assembly Approves Measure to Set Staffing Ratios at Nursing Homes,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 112, Jun 11, 2001, at A-6 (discussing legislative progress of bill to
set minimum staff-to-patient ratios for nurses at skilled nursing facilities). Improved staff-
patient ratios are designed both to enhance the quality of patient care and to address the nurs-
ing staff shortage which currently exists nationwide; heavy patient loads are a major contribut-
ing factor to nurses' dissatisfaction with the nursing field and are cited in a number of studies
examining nursing burnout. See Advocates for Nurse Staffing Ratios Say JAMA Study Boosts
Their Cause, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 207, Oct. 25, 2002, at A-9 (noting study published in
Journal of the American Medical Association that showed a correlation between increased
surgical patient loads for nurses and patient mortality); Nurses See Better Staff-Patient Ratios,
Increased Pay as Top Fixes for Shortage, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 12, Jan. 17, 2003, at A-5
(reporting results of survey in which 85 percent of respondent nurses mentioned reducing the
nurse/patient ratio as a strategy to address nursing staff shortages nationwide; improving pay
was mentioned by 82 percent of the respondents).
216. See Laura Mahoney, Final Regulations Give California First-in-Nation Nurse Staffing
Ratios, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 190, Oct. 1, 2003, at A-5 (describing final regulations
setting staffing ratios for hospitals).
217. Dionne Koller Fine, Exploitation of the Elite: A Case for Physician Unionization, 45 ST.
Louis L.J. 207, 212 (2001).
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see unions as incompatible with professional status.21 Some worry
that unionization is inherently incompatible with professionalism; to
unionize would associate them with the blue-collar workforce, and
would communicate that they viewed their work as a job rather than
as a profession. While unionization might confer a temporary im-
provement in bargaining power, these physicians fear a long-term loss
of prestige, income, and social status and influence.i 9
However, increasing numbers find unionization a rational re-
sponse to the rise of managed care. A recent survey of 1200 physi-
cians practicing in the northeast found that 69 percent would join a
union.220 Moreover, if residents and house-staff take advantage of the
organizing protections and bargaining rights afforded by the National
Labor Relations Board's recent change of position on the covered
status of interns and residents under the NLRA,221 a pro-union shift in
doctors' attitudes toward unions may follow. 22  Residents and interns
are more likely to perceive the utility of unionization because of the
compelling organizing issues presented by their working conditions,
218. Indeed, as one commentator has observed, the very fact of employee status-which is a
predicate for protected unionization under current law-may be viewed by many physicians as a
significant departure from the idealized self-image of the independent private practitioner
American physician. Thus, the emergence of physicians' unions underscores the significance of
that departure from the ideal, and in turn signals the descent from a privileged class into work-
ing class status. See BUDRYS, supra note 26, at 71-72.
219. Lutsky, supra note 194, at 92; BUDRYS, supra note 26, at 15.
220. James L. Frank et al., Physician Labor Union Formation: Attitudes of 400 Physicians, 7
J. INDIVID. EMP. RTS. 331, 341 (1999). Physicians trained outside the U.S. and specialists were
more than twice as likely to be favorably disposed toward unions. Id. Of those who weren't
favorably disposed, the most frequent reason given was concern about ethical obligations not to
strike. Only 45 percent of the overall population surveyed would participate in a strike involving
withholding elective patient care; foreign-educated physicians and specialists, however, were
more than twice as likely to be willing to participate in such a strike. Id.
Of course, economic alternatives to the strike exist, and willingness to unionize should
not be coextensive with willingness to strike. For example, doctors might engage in a financial
strike rather than a care strike, in which they would provide care to patients but would refuse to
accept their insurance, instead negotiating private payment schedules with patients and relying
on patients to pressure insurance companies or HMOs. See Christopher Guadagnino, Physician
Unions Gain Steam, at http://www.physiciansnews.com/cover/1297.html (Dec. 1997).
221. See Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 152 (1999) (finding interns, residents,
and fellows to be covered employees within the meaning of the NLRA for purposes of organiz-
ing and collective bargaining, because they function primarily as employees rather than as
students). Prior to Boston Medical, the Board had considered residents and housestaff to be
more akin to students than to employees, and had excluded them from the Act's coverage. See
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 253 (1976) (finding primary purpose of housestaff
positions is educational); St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1002 (1977) (af-
firming Cedars-Sinai and refining test for student/employee distinction). At public hospitals,
however, state labor board and state court decisions permitted housestaff to organize. Cramm,
supra note 7, at 1614-15.
222. See Cramm, supra note 7, at 1603-04 & n.5.
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notoriously long hours, and captive status; exit is not an option.223 In
addition, residents and interns are the first line physicians who feel
the sting of job consolidation stemming from reduced staffing at lev-
els beneath them in the professional hierarchy. Reduction in nursing
staff shifts many of the duties previously performed by nursing staff
to interns and residents, including unskilled or menial tasks not con-
sistent with professional status. Indeed, the attenuated relationship
between many of the tasks performed by housestaff and the profes-
sional educational process was among the reasons mentioned by the
Board in Boston Medical Center for categorizing them as primarily
employees rather than students.22 4 Eventually, medical residents and
interns will become physicians, taking with them the pro-union senti-
ments that they developed during earlier years.
Overall, it appears that the devaluation of medical professional-
ism and revocation of traditional privileges of autonomy afforded
doctors in the social bargain between doctors and society is provoking
unprecedented anger and radicalism among doctors, and at least
some of it is finding an outlet in unionization.22 Such activism is not,
223. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. at 45 (Brame, dissenting) (noting that residents
lack the freedom to move easily from employer to employer, making resort to the strike weapon
less likely); see id. at 154 n.6 (discussing long hours and related patient tragedies).
224. See id. at 154 (noting that house staff at BMC spent up to 80 percent of their time
engaged in direct patient care). According to the Regional Director's opinion, their responsibili-
ties include starting intravenous lines, drawing blood, taking medical histories, performing CPR,
and other activities which non-physician professionals are qualified to perform. See Regional
Director's Decision and Order, reprinted in Boston Med. Ctr. Corp, 330 N.L.R.B. 152 app. at
184 (1999).
225. See Valliere, supra note 6, at (summarizing remarks of Professor Grace Budrys (citing
BURDYS, supra note 26)).
In the eyes of the law, however, self-employed physicians are independent contractors
vis-A-vis the health management organizations that they rely upon for reimbursement, rather
than employees covered by the NLRA. Amerihealth, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 870, 870 n.1 (1999)
(finding that physicians who contract to provide services to members of Amerihealth, an HMO,
are independent contractors because the HMO does not exercise significant control over the
physicians' conduct in examining patients, diagnosing illnesses, and performing specific medical
procedures). As a result, they are not covered by the antitrust exemption to the labor laws, and
antitrust considerations bar them from negotiating in groups with managed care companies.
Self-employed physicians have shown a strong interest in legislative reform that would
facilitate collective pressure and bargaining with health plans. Several unions active in physician
organizing and the AMA seek legislative change at the federal level in the form of an exemption
from antitrust regulations that would allow collective negotiation. Representative Thomas J.
Campbell of California introduced the first such proposal in 1999. The Quality Health-Care
Coalition Act of 1999, H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. (1999), purported, in the interest of improving
patient care quality, to confer upon "groups of health care professionals" negotiating with
HMOs, insurers, or other health care payors "the same treatment under the antitrust laws
accorded to members of a bargaining unit recognized under the National Labor Relations Act."
Unions seeking to organize physicians have also pursued state antitrust reform. In 1999, Texas
became the first state to adopt a law which would exempt physicians from antitrust laws in order
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however, "radicalism" in the usual sense of seeking to overthrow the
existing social structure. Instead, it is a deeply conservative response
that seeks to preserve the social meaning and privileges of profes-
sionalism-to enforce the social bargain.2 26 In this sense, physicians
who unionize are not so different from the blue-collar workers who
have struck to preserve the social contract of permanence that they
believed undergirded their work arrangements. 2
21
In short, housestaff and physician unionizing is prompted by the
challenge to professional identity and the social position that it has
historically secured. Functionalists trusted professional ethical norms
to curb abuses of professional power; professionalism itself was the
primary means of social control over physicians.228 Physicians em-
to allow them to negotiate collectively through third party administrators on reimbursement and
contract issues. See Texas Gov. Bush Signs First-Ever Law Allowing Doctors to Bargain with
HMOs, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 119, June 22, 1999, at A-2; Attorney General Proposes
Rules For First Physician Bargaining Law, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 45, Nov. 18, 1999, at
1827.
One creative strategy utilized by unions seeking to avoid the antitrust restrictions on
bargaining by self-employed physicians or medical practice groups is the Messenger Model
independent practice association (IPA). Messenger Model IPAs are intended to allow self-
employed physicians to market themselves to payors as a network without engaging in price-
fixing. See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Physicians, Unions, and Antitrust, 32 J. HEALTH L. 43, 60-62
(1999). A messenger communicates with each physician individually to ascertain the fee sched-
ule (which may be a fee range) that each is willing to accept. The messenger then aggregates the
information and develops a schedule showing what percentage of physicians in the network
would accept offers at given fee levels or ranges (however, the fee schedule should not require
the health plan or insurer to meet those price ranges in order to contract with the network). Id.
Without sharing that information with the individual physicians, the messenger presents the
schedule to the payors. The messenger may accept offers made by the payor that are within the
fee range of any physician that he represents, but may not negotiate over prices with the payor
on behalf of the physicians. Id. Offers not within the fee range given by the individual physician
must be communicated to the individual physician for acceptance or rejection. The messenger
may not advise the physicians on acceptance, and the physicians may not communicate with one
another about whether to accept particular offers. See http://www.fpdunion.org/ (Website of the
Federation of Physicians & Dentists, a physicians' union); EDWARD B. HIRSHFELD, AM.
HEALTH LAWYERS ASs'N., PHYSICIANS, UNIONS, AND ANTITRUST 11-12 (1998). Messenger
Model IPAs have been challenged under the antitrust laws in at least six states-Connecticut,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Ohio, and Texas. See Sarah A. Klein, Physicians' Union Feels
Antitrust Scrutiny, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 9, 1998, at 3; John W. Jones, Physician Messenger
Model Under Fire, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIG., at http://physiciansnews.com/law/203.html (Feb.
2003). The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice have developed a set of
parameters designed to assist in determining the legality of such arrangements. See U.S. DEPT.
OF. JUSTICE, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 106
(1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0000.htm.
226. See BUDRYS, supra note 26, at 95.
227. See JUSTICE IN THE COALFIELDS (Appalshop Film & Video 1995) (describing 1990s
strike by Virginia coal miners against Pittston coal over demise of social contract between coal
mine owners and community); see also Crain, supra note 155, at 1926 (describing demise of
social promise of permanence in employment and in marriage).
228. See BUDRYS, supra note 26, at 35-36.
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braced functionalism and internalized it as part of professional iden-
tity. It is not surprising, then, when they react with outrage when their
autonomy is denied; the social compact between physicians and soci-
ety has been violated. In the modern era, the need for professional
self-monitoring receded as other mechanisms of social control
emerged.229 Managed care, risk management practices and cost con-
trols utilized by hospitals and other institutional employers, the spec-
ter of medical malpractice liability, and a more highly educated
patient base with ready access via the internet to extensive informa-
tion about medical treatments230 reduced the justification for self-
monitoring and autonomy. The path was paved for the commodifica-
tion of medicine.
C. Lawyers
Lawyers have been far less inclined toward unionization than
doctors, despite the presence of a similar trend in the profession to-
ward employee status, bureaucratization and loss of ideological con-
trol over work, loss of control over time, standardization of output,
and loss of autonomy. Most law professors would argue that lawyers'
profc_:'ional self-image is fundamentally inconsistent with the modern
organizational structure and demands of large law firms, government
practice, and legal services work for legal technicians.2 3' Yet the focus
229. See id. at 66.
230. See id. at 70.
231. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 161, at 7-10 (suggesting that lawyers' professionalism is
characterized by independence and individual control over the legal work we undertake, the
clients on whose behalf we advocate and the strategies we use to represent them). Gordon
describes the professional life to which lawyers aspire in this way:
[T]he professional life is appealing because professionals can, within the confines of their
need to make a living, structure their own time, choose among their commitments, and be
selective about the people they work with and for and the causes to which they lend their
talents. They are relatively free to follow the dictates of craft and conscience and the ad-
vice of discriminating peers, rather than pursue only profit and worldly success. And yet,
miraculously, they may not actually have to sacrifice all hope of income and success, be-
cause professional (unlike, let us say, artistic) integrity will command public recognition
and a market premium. The independent professional can, ideally, both 'do good and do
well.'
Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted). Gordon points out that it may not be necessary for lawyers to resist
bureaucratization in order to maintain professional independence, if other safeguards are in
place, such as an advantageous market position, a diverse client base, a reservoir of trust and a
long term relationship with one's client base, social influence over clients deriving from a law-
yer's individual social standing or from the client's need for approval of third parties, particu-
larly government agencies, authority deriving from special expertise, and a firm culture that
promotes independence. See id. at 35-39. Control over one's own time is a key condition of
independence, however, and in the modern firm individual associates lack such control; instead,
it is exercised at a managerial level, usually by the executive committee. See id. at 39-40.
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on output as measured by standardized units (the billable hour),2 32
pressure towards specialization, and limits imposed by government on
the types of litigation that legal services lawyers may undertake
233
tends to produce lawyers who are defined more by their technical
skills than by their ability to influence public policy and public law.
234
Still, one rarely hears of lawyers organizing unions. Why are lawyers
relatively quiescent in the face of pressures toward commodification?
The ABA historically opposed unionization for attorneys, and
specifically banned government lawyers from joining unions.235 The
bar's primary concern was the creation of divided loyalties (between
client and union), specifically, the worry that the union-member-
attorney would surrender her independent judgment and be required
to submit to direction by the union officers and directors even when
client interests were compromised. 236 In 1967, the ABA changed
course and permitted attorneys to join unions with two caveats: the
attorneys could not strike, and the union had to be independent of
unions representing nonlawyers.2 37 Eventually, the ABA backed away
even from these limitations, requiring only that lawyers not surrender
their independence to an employee organization, and that the lawyer
remain vigilant to avoid neglect of legal matters entrusted to her and
232. Standardized measures of productivity assume significance even in the public sector.
Government lawyers are required to keep meticulous records in order to justify the agency's
budget requests to Congress.
233. See Weissman, supra note 176, at 758 (examining restrictions on legal services lawyers).
234. This trend toward specialization and lawyering as a craft is not new. Woodrow Wilson's
remarks to the ABA in the early 1900s illustrate a similar concern:
You cannot but have marked the recent changes in the relation of lawyers to affairs
in this country; and, if you feel as I do about the great profession to which we belong,
you cannot but have been made uneasy by the change. Lawyers constructed the fab-
ric of our state governments and of the government of the United States, and
throughout the earlier periods of our national development presided over all the lar-
ger processes of politics.... Every question of public policy seemed sooner or later to
become a question of law, upon which trained lawyers must be consulted .... A new
type of lawyers has been created; and that new type has come to be the prevailing
type. Lawyers have been sucked into the maelstrom of the new business system of the
country. That system is highly technical and highly specialized.... [Lawyers] do not
handle the general, miscellaneous interests of society. They are not general counsel-
ors of right and obligation.
Woodrow Wilson, The Lawyer and the Community (An Address in Chattanooga Tennessee to
the American Bar Association (Aug. 31, 1910)), in 21 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, at
64, 69-70 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1976).
235. Laura Midwood & Amy Vitacco, The Right of Attorneys to Unionize, Collectively
Bargain, and Strike: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 299, 315-
16 (2000).
236. See id. at 316.
237. See id. at 315-16 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Informal Op.
986 (1967)).
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place her clients' interests first.238 Participation in strikes is not a per
se violation of ethics unless in striking the attorney violates a discipli-
nary rule (such as neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him, failing to
carry out an employment contract with a client, or prejudicing or
damaging his client's interests by his conduct).239 Some commentators
have suggested that ethical canons may not only permit, but actually
require attorneys to strike in some circumstances-for example,
where the lawyer cannot provide competent and zealous representa-
tion because of case loads, lack of resources for representation (e.g.,
lack of funds for expert witnesses), or employer policies interfering
with representation (such as a Legal Aid Society's practice of assign-
ing different lawyers to represent the same client at successive stages
of a case). 24°
With the ABA's imprimatur, unions gained a foothold among
government lawyers and lawyers employed in the nonprofit sector.
Government lawyers, court-appointed public defenders, and legal aid
attorneys began to seek the protections of collective action or union
organization. 241 The impetus for organizing has fallen into two catego-
ries: demands for better pay, and demands for improvements in work-
ing conditions that would facilitate competent performance of the
lawyer's role (such as reduction in case loads, office space consistent
238. See id. at 316-17 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op.
1325 (1975), discussing Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-13, which provides:
A lawyer shall not maintain membership in or be influenced by any organization of
employees that undertakes to prescribe, direct, or suggest when or how he should ful-
fill his professional obligations to a person or organization that employs him as a law-
yer. Although it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer employed by a corporation
or similar entity to be a member of an organization of employees, he should be vigi-
lant to safeguard his fidelity as a lawyer to his employer, free from outside influence.)
239. See id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1325
(1975) (discussing disciplinary rules 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2), and 7-101(A)(3))).
240. See id. at 318-23.
241. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers' Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (finding that a
strike by court-appointed counsel to represent the indigent in criminal cases in the District of
Columbia violated federal antitrust laws); Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B.
1269, 1273 (1978) (finding attorneys employed as unit heads in a nonprofit organization that
provided legal services to the indigent covered professionals under the NLRA; they were nei-
ther supervisors nor managers); Northwest Fla. Legal Serv., Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 92, 93-94 (1995)
(finding head of litigation unit in nonprofit legal services organization to be a covered profes-
sional without supervisorial duties); Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 734 So. 2d
1030, 1036 (Fla. 1999) (striking down a 1994 Florida law that prohibited public sector attorneys
in the Department of Insurance, the comptroller's office, the Department of Transportation,
and the Department of Business and Professional Regulations from organizing); Chief Judge of
the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit v. I11. State Labor Relations Bd., 687 N.E.2d 795, 798 (I11. 1997)
(finding assistant public defenders managerial employees not covered by the Illinois Public
Labor Relations Act).
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with maintaining client confidentiality, adequate library resources,
computer equipment, access to online legal research tools, and
nonlawyer support staff such as law clerks and paralegals).2 42 Both of
these sorts of demands involve a defense of professional identity. The
first is directed toward defending class status and professional pres-
tige, while the second category demands are necessary for lawyers to
fulfill the social bargain as competent professionals. Legal services
attorneys have been willing to strike to press their demands.21 3
Private law firms have been the least likely crucibles for union-
ism. Nonetheless, in April 2003, sixteen lawyers at Parker Stanbury in
Phoenix, Arizona voted unanimously to join Teamsters Local 104.244
Among the issues mobilizing associates were inadequate access to
legal research materials, performance quotas, and being forced to
work in open cubicles that compromised client confidentiality. 245 Not
coincidentally, Parker Stanbury has a contract to provide prepaid
legal services for poor and middle class persons seeking access to a
lawyer.2 46 Union substitutes seem even more promoising as vehicles
for attorney representation and voice. One such vehicle emerged on
the Internet in 1998: www.greedyassociates.com. 247 Although the
name of the organization and its website connotes only monetary
concerns, the website has proved to be a lightning rod for discussion
of a variety of issues, many of which reveal a perception that profes-
sional identity is under siege at a broader level. The lawyers on
Greedy Associates discuss firm salaries, benefit packages,
work/family accommodation and leave programs, and technical tips,
among many other topics. 248 Because the site is occupation-wide
242. Rabban, supra note 14; Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 232, at 310-14.
243. See Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 232, at 310-14 (describing strikes by Legal Aid and
Legal Services attorneys in New York City during the 1980s and 1990s over wages and
caseloads; caseloads were as high as 650 cases per year per lawyer in some offices, salaries were
less than $26,000 per year for some public sector attorneys, and hourly rates for court-appointed
attorneys ranged from $13 per hour to $75 per hour).
244. NLRB Certifies IBT as Bargaining Agent For Unit of Private Attorneys in Phoenix,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 64, Apr. 3,2003, at A-7.
245. Tresa Baldas, Lawyers Unionize, Vote to Join the Teamsters, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 8, 2003,
reprinted at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1048518259019.
246. See id.
247. See Debra Baker, ShowMeTheMoney.com: Associates Are Turning Internet Hangouts
Into De Facto Union Halls, A.B.A. J., June 2000, at 18. The purpose of the organization was to
allow law firm associates to exchange information about their law firms. See
http://www.greedyassociates.com.
248. See Baker, supra note 247, at 20. Generation X associates are demanding, and receiv-
ing, mentoring and training programs. Terry Carter, A New Breed, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2001, at 37,
40. They are also seeking firm accommodations for parenting and work/life balance programs.
See Denise Magnell, Short-Term Sacrifices, Long-Term Payoff, AM. LAW. MEDIA, Apr. 18,
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rather than limited to a single firm or worksite, participants are able
to compare and contrast firm policies. This information-sharing func-
tion has enabled participants to reap quasiunion benefits by placing
pressure on large firms to match the programs that others are offering
in order to avoid attorney attrition.2 49
The Generation X attorneys who participate in the chats on the
Greedy Associates website share a radically different set of values
from those of the partners at their law firms. They feel entitled to
certain levels of pay, benefits, training, and lifestyle accommodations,
and demand them on penalty of exit.250 The threat of exit is no bluff-
41 percent of law firm associates change firms within the first three or
four years of practice,2 51 either to pursue professional development
opportunities, different practice interests, or to obtain financial ad-
vantages.2 52 Most young attorneys do not assume that they will stay
with the firm until they make partner; indeed, they view themselves
increasingly as relatively short-term workers rather than as aspiring
partners, perhaps in a predictable response to the big law firms' busi-
ness-style approach to law firm management."3 Other postings reflect
fears about job security, including warnings of layoffs and downsiz-
ings in response to economic downturns.5 4
Some of the postings on the Greedy Associates' web page sug-
gest that the underlying cause of attorney dissatisfaction does not
concern income at all-instead, it is about respect. As one poster
wrote, "'How much you gunna pay me' does matter. It shows how
much (or how little) they think you're 'worth' as an attorney....
2000, available at www.law.com/jsp/newswire-article.jsp?id=1015973964125. Included among
these are sabbatical leaves to reduce burnout, see Kurt Sauer, The Pause That Refreshes, TEX.
LAW., Mar. 29, 1999, at 1, formalized mentoring arrangements with partners, see Anna Snider,
Weil Gotshal Takes Aim at Burnout: Program Boosts Bonuses and Lawyer Relationships, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 8, 1999, at 24, and paternity leave policies, see Scott Brede, Father-Friendly Firms
Flourish, CONN. L. TRIB., July 18, 2000.
249. See Neil, supra note 163, at 24, 25.
250. Carter, supra note 248, at 40; Paula A. Patton, Lateral Moves Now Part of Landscape;
How Paradigm Shift Impacts the Profession, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 9, 2001, at S5 (discussing a NALP
Foundation research study of 2,200 lateral lawyers, titled The Lateral Lawyer: Why They Leave
and What May Make Them Stay).
251. Carter, supra note 248, at 40.
252. See Patton, supra note 250.
253. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Waging A War of Attrition: Some Grew, Some Shrank, but
the Real Game was Turnover, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 13, 1999, at Al.
254. Postings by Gardener on Apr. 2, 2001 (message no. 4966), at
http://,vww.greedyassociates.com/messageboard/. One poster suggested that the forum name
should be changed to "'Just want to keep my Job' Associates." Posting by kmw4899 on Apr. 17,
2001 (message no. 5079), at http://www.greedyassociates.com/messageboard/.
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[Through lack of raises] [t]hey're telling you in not so many words
that you have no future. '255 All in all, the Greedy Associates postings
reflect the cognitive dissonance between the professional image of an
autonomous lawyer and the reality of practice experienced by many
attorneys, and a widespread dissatisfaction with the practice of law.256
In short, collective protest does exist in the private for-profit sec-
tor, albeit in nontraditional forms. In addition to participation on
websites, many young attorneys have expressed their dissatisfaction
through exit from the profession.257 Others have stayed in the profes-
sion but endured health problems and clinical depression,25 8 or
adopted dysfunctional coping methods such as substance abuse. 2 9 An
entire genre of books dedicated to assisting lawyers in finding mean-
ing in life has grown up in the last two decades. 260
D. Administrative Law Judges
Perhaps the most unlikely group of union adherents among law-
yers is judges. However, even judges will respond with collective ac-
tion when professional identity is threatened. In 1999, 1000 ALJs
working for the SSA voted to unionize by an overwhelming 88 per-
cent majority, affiliating with the International Federation of Profes-
255. Posting by eyestrain on May 2, 2001 (message no. 5176), at
http://www.greedyassociates.com/messageboard/. Some firms are responding to associates'
concerns by shifting from the lockstep model of pay according to year of tenure to performance-
based pay. See William G. Johnston & Joseph B. Altonji, Eliminate Lockstep Model and Reward
Performance, Not Time Served, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 27, 2001, at S6. Linking motivation and perform-
ance to compensation is considered more likely to improve morale than simply throwing more
money in the form of additional bonuses at dissatisfied associates, because it treats them as
individuals rather than as fungible, the equivalent of human robots. See id. Even at these firms,
however, quantity of billable hours remain a key component of merit determination. Nathan
Koppel, The Next Pay Revolution, AM. LAW., Feb. 13, 2001 (on file with author).
256. See Holmes, supra note 151, at 376-77 (1996) (summarizing results of various surveys
which showed that by the 1990s, 19 percent of attorneys in private practice were dissatisfied with
their work, with many of those at the senior levels of the firm; a North Carolina survey found
that 25 percent of lawyers would choose another occupation if they could relive their lives).
257. See DEBORAH L. ARRON, RUNNING FROM THE LAW: WHY GOOD LAWYERS ARE
GETTING OUT OF THE PROFESSION (1989).
258. See Holmes, supra note 151, at 377-78 (75 percent of lawyers report that they are
chronically anxious; over 50 percent experience mental or physical strain; more than 33 percent
suffer from depression; and the suicide rate for lawyers is at least twice as high as that for the
general population).
259. See id. at 378-80 (alcoholism rates among lawyers are estimated at 15 percent, com-
pared to a national average of 10 percent).
260. See, e.g., ARRON, supra note 257.
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sional and Technical Engineers. 261 The impetus for organization was a
steady stream of SSA efforts to undercut the ALJs' judicial inde-
pendence and autonomy, including imposition of a quota system by
which productivity was measured (assessing performance solely by
reference to the number of dispositions rather than quality of work or
complexity of cases), 262 substantive review of judicial resolutions to
ensure that at least two-thirds of the cases decided were resolved in
favor of the government,2 63 loss of supervisory control over staff and
clericals (apparently in part as a result of the fact that clericals and
attorney staff members are unionized, and deal directly with man-
agement rather than with the ALJs), 264 and transfer of authority to
paralegals to make determinations about which cases are appropriate
for hearing and which should be decided on the record (in order to
reduce backlogs).
The major impetus for the SSA ALJ organizing drive was the
SSA's effort to deprofessionalize the ALJs. For example, the ALJs
explained that they perceived the SSA office as imposing controls and
limitations inconsistent with their "natural" authority as judges; some
of the controls imposed undermined the judges' ability to fairly re-
solve the interests of claimants, which the judges view as central to
their professional identity. Further, the SSA would not bargain with
the Association of Administrative Law Judges, a professional organi-
zation that did not have bargaining status under the Federal Labor
Relations Act (which covers federal government employees). At the
same time, the SSA was bargaining with the unions who represented
other employees subordinate to the ALJs in the workplace hierar-
261. See Dorsey, supra note 10. The ALJs at the SSA are not the only unionized judges-for
example, an AFL-CIO affiliated union that represents 220 immigration judges. See NewsWatch,
LAB. NOTES, Mar. 2002, at 4.
262. See Editorial, Mass Justice, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1983 (describing efforts of SSA admin-
istrators to improve judicial output); Al Kamen, Law Judges Charge Illegal Quotas Set on Dis-
ability Cases, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1983 (describing the performance rating system for ALJs
which requires judges to hear a quota of cases each month and to resolve no more than two-
thirds of them against the government).
263. Kamen, supra note 262 (noting that judges who did not meet the quotas would be
subject to removal from office); see also Felicity Barringer, Administrative Judge Faced With
Dismissal for Low Productivity, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1983 (discussing AL's dismissal for
failure to meet production quota, and noting that the ALJ's "legal competence, fairness and
diligence [were] not being challenged"); Martin Tolchin, Judges Who Decide Social Security
Claims Say Agency Goads Them to Deny Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1989, at 16 (reporting
ALJ's complaints about the quota requirements and substantive review of decisions, and detail-
ing punitive measures taken by judges who failed to conform).
264. Dorsey, supra note 10; Telephone Interview with Judge Ira Epstein, Administrative
Law Judge, Social Security Admin. (Nov. 5, 2001).
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chy-attorneys, clericals, even janitors.265 The ALJs alone lacked a
voice at the bargaining table. Traditional workplace issues-a lack of
coherent travel or transfer policies, and respect issues about parking
and office space266 -were relevant too. The overriding theme was the
threat to the ALJs' professional identity as judges and to their rela-
tively privileged status in the workplace hierarchy. One comment
reported in the press succinctly captured the basis of the ALJs' un-
rest: "The Social Security Administration doesn't treat judges like
judges.... They treat them as other employees. '267
While lawyers of all stripes have so far appeared less interested
in unionizing than physicians, those lawyers who have been subject to
the highest degree of bureaucratization and have lost technical con-
trol as well as ideological control over their work have responded
with enthusiasm to union organizing efforts. Legal services attorneys,
government attorneys, and ALJs have proved receptive to unioniza-
tion, perhaps because bureaucratization and scientific management
pose a threat to their class privilege as well as to their professional
competence. For lawyers in private firms, class privilege seems secure;
it is only professional competence/autonomy that is threatened.
Moreover, if professional organizing is triggered by the need to
defend professional identity, perhaps the reason for the disparity in
organizing between physicians and lawyers is that lawyers are less
invested in their professional identities than physicians. Attorneys
generally have fewer years of education invested in their professional
identities than do physicians, which may increase the likelihood that
they will choose exit over voice. Additionally, attorneys may be able
to obtain significant improvements by moving to another firm, field of
practice, or form of legal work; the pressure towards commodification
is not as universal across the practice of law as it is across the practice
of medicine because of the absence of third party payors. Finally,
opportunities for exit outside law abound: the law degree provides an
entree into other fields; again reducing the likelihood that dissatisfied
attorneys will choose voice over exit.
265. Id.
266. See Debra Cassens Moss, Judges Under Fire: ALJ Independence At Issue, A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1991, at 56 (noting ALJ discontent over loss of secretaries, loss of parking spaces, inade-
quate numbers of law clerks, inadequate facilities, but observing that the threat to the ALJs'
professional status and independence posed by productivity quotas was the major basis for
unrest).
267. Tolchin, supra note 263 (quoting Judge Nahum Litt, then chief AU for the Depart-
ment of Labor).
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V. RECONCEPTUALIZING UNIONISM: UNIONS FOR INDIVIDUALISTS
With this positive evidence of willingness to engage in collective
action to defend professional identity, why haven't professionals
forged a stronger alliance with traditional unions? While some pro-
fessionals have been willing to do so, many have resisted. The most
significant basis for this reluctance to make common cause with tradi-
tional unions is a fundamental unwillingness to sacrifice class privi-
lege by allying with workers beneath them in the occupational and
social hierarchy. This is often expressed as a profound commitment to
an ethos of individual achievement and merit.
A. The Role of Class Privilege
Privilege and status play a vital role in the construction of profes-
sional identity. Professionals' distance from the working class is a
significant common bond among professionals. 68 As the revisionists
predicted, rather than allying itself with the working class to advance
common interests, the professional class has sought to differentiate
itself from the working class, endeavoring to retain privileges not
available to nonprofessionals so as to maintain its status.269 Profes-
sionals' concern with status, particularly relative status based on com-
parisons of their own situations with those of other workers, thus
blocks alliances with workers in lower classes. Because unions are
associated exclusively with the working class, resort to unionization
would symbolize a loss in status.270 Ultimately, professional status has
become "an ideological consolation used by employers to accommo-
date professional workers' needs for status privileges, or a negotiating
device used by professionals themselves to justify wages and privi-
leges that differ from those of other workers. 27 1 Thus, alliances be-
268. LARSON, supra note 27, at xvi.
269. Derber, Professionals As New Workers, supra note 25, at 21. See, e.g., Barbara & John
Ehrenreich, The Professional-Managerial Class, in BETWEEN LABOUR AND CAPITAL 5, 5-7, 9-
10 (Pat Walker ed., 1979). These authors argue that the professional managerial class is a dis-
tinct class which manages its opposition to capital by exploiting the working class. Id. at 17.
Some believe that "[m]anagement has replaced capital as the main enemy of organized labor in
the United States." HODGES, supra note 33, at 15.
270. LARSON, supra note 27, at 236. Professional employees are individualistic in orientation
and have historically looked down upon unions, either because they are perceived as blue-collar
organizations, because they are self-interested and narrowly economic in their agenda, or be-
cause they pursue confrontational strategies that escalate conflict.
271. Derber, Professionals As New Workers, supra note 25, at 15-16. An analogous defense
of privilege-in this case, racial privilege-historically blocked whites from making common
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tween professionals and non-professional workers may threaten pro-
fessional identity.
More insidiously, professionals' concern with status and privilege
also blocks alliances among professionals, at least in the form of un-
ionization. Capitalist ideology traditionally links job entitlement to
individual performance, ensuring that individuals assume both the
credit and the blame for their positions in the employment hierar-
chy.272 A relatively small percentage of workers possess "underem-
ployment consciousness" - a form of work alienation in which
workers become aware that their skills are being wasted or underuti-
lized, and that work may not ever be an area of fulfillment for them.273
Less than one-third of workers express such a consciousness, which
Derber believes may be attributable to a "pervasive and often un-
founded faith in the American Dream of individual opportunity and
occupational mobility. '27 4 Only a sustained economic decline suffi-
cient to close the channels of occupational mobility would shake this
faith, which in turn blocks the formation of class/group conscious-
ness. ' 275 Accordingly, in order to appeal to highly educated workers,
unions would have to embrace the individual achievement explana-
tion for status and job entitlement, at least to some degree; otherwise,
unions' historical association with the universalistic entitlement
model would clash with the self-perception of highly educated work-
ers.
276
Moreover, resistance to an alliance between professionals and
the working class is not one-sided. Non-college graduates in Derber's
study also displayed a universalistic belief in job entitlement, which
Derber interprets as "a subtle expression of class interest, in opposi-
tion to the traditional individualistic criteria of entitlement. '' 277 The
anti-individualist philosophy that characterizes traditional forms of
unionism is obviously an uneasy fit with the ideology of professional-
cause with Blacks in the labor movement. See Marion Crain, Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1313, 1320-22 (2002).
272. Derber, supra note 180, at 27-28.
273. See Derber, supra note 183, at 37.
274. Id. at 43.
275. Id. at 43-44. Conditions of scarcity tend to intensify the cultural contradictions experi-
enced by highly educated workers, making revolt and mobilization into political action more
likely-though not necessarily in common cause with less highly educated workers. See Derber,
supra note 180, at 34-36.
276. Derber, supra note 180, at 34-36.
277. Id. at 31.
[Vol 79:543
2004] THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL WORKFORCE 599
ism and the class mobility aspirations of white-collar workers more
generally.
B. Unions for Generation X?
Nor is the dilemma of class privilege that unions face in attempt-
ing to ally workers across class lines limited to the professional versus
nonprofessional context. Young workers entering the labor market at
all levels increasingly subscribe to an individualist philosophy. Unlike
earlier age cohorts, however, generation X workers (defined as those
between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five) possess a fundamentally
individualistic view of themselves and their own skills as the sole
source of leverage in a restructured modern labor market that in-
creasingly decentralizes and individualizes the labor process. 27 8 In the
modern market environment of flexible work, risk-taking, and entre-
preneurialism, old patterns of collective action focused on obtaining
job security and guaranteeing longevity of employment have been
replaced by individual-level responses to economic insecurity. 279 Con-
sequently, the workers in Generation X focus on training opportuni-
ties to enhance their skills, merit-based pay, and individual
advancement opportunities, rather than on the traditional bread-and-
butter issues of union contracts-wages, rates of pay tied to years of
service and job description, and insurance and retirement benefits
tied to a single firm.280
As employers reorganize the structure of work toward flexible,
short-term, project-based work, the risk of responsibility for getting
and keeping work is shifted onto employees and away from employ-
ers.28 Highly educated, highly skilled mobile young workers accept
this ideology of risk and seek to profit from it.282 Thus, Generation X
278. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 1-2 (1996):
[clapitalism itself has undergone a process of profound restructuring, characterized by
greater flexibility in management; decentralization and networking of firms both internally
and in their relationships to other firms; considerable empowering of capital vis-a-vis labor,
with the concomitant decline of influence of the labor movement; increasing individualiza-
tion and diversification of working relationships;... intervention of the state to deregulate
markets selectively, and to undo the welfare state;... [and] stepped-up global economic
competition.
279. See Gina Neff, Risk Relations: The New Uncertainties of Work, WORKINGUSA, Fall
2001, at 59, 60-61.
280. See Michael Bologna, Generation X Supports Organized Labor, But Some Say It Sees
Unions As Irrelevant, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 241, Dec. 12, 2002, at C-2.
281. See Neff, supra note 279, at 60.
282. Id. at 63-64.
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workers strive to augment and protect their skill sets as a means of
enhancing their leverage with employers. They willingly exchange job
security for individual market leverage. 83 They are not averse to
walking off the job to achieve their ends-but in a strategy of individ-
ual exit rather than in a coordinated strike action aimed at improving
conditions at the workplace where they are currently employed. Ac-
cordingly, traditional unions with their job-protective collective bar-
gaining contracts and strike weapons are a poor fit with Generation X
workers. As Professor Gary Chaison succinctly put it, Generation X
workers view unions as "irrelevant" to the modern economic and
social structures in which they must compete. 84
Nevertheless, evidence is mounting that Generation X workers
are favorably disposed toward unions as a vehicle for voice in the
workplace. In a recent AFL-CIO study, dropping the "U" word when
asking workers what sort of workplace voice they would like to have
increased positive sentiment toward collective workplace strategies
from a 23 percent positive response toward unions to 31 percent posi-
tive response toward an association which would perform exactly the
same functions a union would; further increases in positive response
occurred as the word "bargaining" was removed from the question. 85
Among Generation X, 58 percent said they would join a union if
given the opportunity. 86 This high level of interest in unions is borne
out by the recent wave of graduate student organizing across the
country.287
283. See Tom Peters, The Brand Called You, FAST COMPANY, Aug./Sep., 1997, at 83, avail-
able at http://fastcompany.com/online/10/brandyou.html (depicting economic insecurity and
organizational flexibility as opportunities to be exploited by individual workers, and advising
workers to reimagine themselves as "CEOs of [their] own companies: Me Inc.").
284. Bologna, supra note 280, at C-1. Professor Chaison explains:
[G]eneration X workers use the issue of their work skills as leverage in the work-
place. Although previous generations may have seen a long-term, collectively bar-
gained contract as essential for gaining respect,... younger workers use the quality
and level of their job skills to obtain the wages, benefits, and employment terms they
seek from employers. When employment terms fail to meet generation X workers'
expectations,... members of this group are more likely to walk out the door than en-
gineer a job action with other workers.
Id.
285. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 150-51 (1999).
286. Bologna, supra note 280, at C-1.
287. See id. at C-2. Nonetheless, it is clear that graduate students are not interested in mem-
bership in traditional industrial unions, which they perceive as advancing goals irrelevant to
their concerns. See Cornell Graduate Teaching Assistants Overwhelmingly Reject UA W Affiliate,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) NO. 208, Oct. 28, 2002, at A-2 (reporting election loss for UAW
among research assistants and teaching assistants at Cornell).
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C. Reconceptualizing Unionism
For unions, the question is how to capitalize on this apparent interest.
That opportunities are being created by the commodification of the
labor process in many professions seems clear. Can unions channel
the outrage that professionals are feeling into unionism? In some pro-
fessions, particularly medicine, the potential for harnessing the desire
for voice is great. Where the forces pressing for commodification are
occupation-wide-specifically, the advent of managed care and asso-
ciated cost-containment measures-exit is an ineffective response
unless the worker is willing to leave the occupation entirely. Physi-
cians in particular have so many years invested in medical education
that exit from the profession seems unlikely. With exit blocked, it is
logical that these professionals would be more likely to turn to voice
as a strategy for change. 88 This may explain the relatively high inci-
dence of organizing by nurses and physicians,289 and the relatively low
incidence of lawyer organizing, where exit (both within the profession
and in tangential areas) is readily available and no occupation-wide
force comparable to managed care exists.
Clearly, unions must reconceptualize themselves if they are to
take advantage of these opportunities. Indeed, doing so is critical to
their survival. In a market characterized by a decline in employment
in blue-collar trades and a dramatic incline in the service sector and
white-collar work, it is no surprise that unions represent only 12.9
percent of the workforce (37.2 percent in the government sector, 8.2
percent in the private sector)- 2g White-collar employees on the other
hand, were 60 percent of the labor force in 2000 (up from 18 percent
in 1900), and they are projected to increase: 98 percent of the growth
of labor markets through 2008 is projected to be in the service sector.
One-third of all white-collar workers, or 19 percent of the total work-
force, were employed in the professions or as highly skilled techni-
288. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 53 (1970) (noting that voice is amplified by the ab-
sence or difficulty of exit).
289. See Paul F. Clark et al., Healthcare Reform and the Workplace Experience of Nurses:
Implications for Patient Care and Union Organizing, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 133, 136, 145
(2001) (observing that industrial relations researchers have identified desire for control or
power over work and influence over work outcomes as connected to an individual's likelihood
of voting for union representation, and predicting that threats to job autonomy, voice, and
power of nurses posed by healthcare reform will produce increased propensity to unionize).
290. Decline in Membership Continued in 2003 To 12.9 Percent of Workforce, BLS Reports,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 13, Jan. 22, 2004, at A-1.
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cians, and these two groups are predicted to be the fastest growing
occupational groups.2 91
Unions have enthusiastically courted professionals. 9 For a mi-
nority of professionals, professional identity has long been thought
compatible with unionization. Despite the widespread perception that
unions are for blue-collar workers, architects, engineers, chemists,
teachers, journalists, air line pilots, and musicians all formed unions in
the New Deal pro-union atmosphere of the 1930s and 1940s. 293 The
AFL-CIO reports that 50 percent of union members in 2000 were
white-collar employees, and many of those are professionals (primar-
ily government employees, teachers and professors, nurses, physi-
cians, social workers, and psychologists).294 Professionals are now the
largest contingent of union members in any occupational category-
greater than 22 percent in 2000.295
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that traditional unionism is a
hard sell to professionals. What alternative forms of unionism might
appeal to them, while also accommodating Generation X's individual-
istic, entrepreneurial vision of work? One model that has been very
successful is the "old media" model of unionism. 96 In the motion pic-
ture and television industries, unions have been successful in gaining
291. DEPARTMENT FOR PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, CURRENT STATISTICS ON
WHITE COLLAR EMPLOYEES at viii (Pamela Wilson ed., 2001).
292. The AFL-CIO's Department for Professional Employees recently launched the Profes-
sional Rights and Opportunities Network, designed to focus on issues of concern to profession-
als, to coordinate public information campaigns, propose model contract language, and
advocate for legislative and regulatory reforms. The earliest fora sponsored on the rights of
professionals have addressed the rights of professionals in media and higher education to a
"zone of professional independence and expression" free from the influence of corporate con-
glomerates. Unions Launch Network to Examine Issues of Concern to Professionals, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) NO. 206, Oct. 24, 2002, at A-2.
293. JURGEN KOCKA, WHITE COLLAR WORKERS IN AMERICA 1890-1940: A SOCIAL-
POLITICAL HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 219-23 (Maura Kealey trans., 1980).
294. DEPARTMENT FOR PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, supra note 291, at viii; see
also White-Collar Workers Joining Union Ranks in Growing Numbers, AFL-CIO Report Says,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 169, Sept. 2, 2003, at A-5 (reporting a surge of successful union
organizing drives among professionals in 2002, including attorneys, teachers, engineers, pharma-
cists, scientists, entertainers, and journalists).
295. DEPARTMENT FOR PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, supra note 291, at viii.
296. I use the phrase "old media" professionals or unions to distinguish them from "new
media" professionals and unions. New media professionals include workers in the computer-
driven economic sector-computer programmers, computer graphic animators, web site design-
ers and others who are essentially the engineers of the computer-driven labor market. See
ROSEMARY BATr ET AL., NET WORKING: WORK PATTERNS AND WORKFORCE POLICIES FOR
THE NEW MEDIA INDUSTRY 12-36 (2001) (discussing challenges for the new media workforce
in keeping abreast of technological advances and acquiring skills to remain marketable and to
advance their careers, finding work, and obtaining protection against illness through health care
benefits).
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and retaining the loyalty of highly skilled, highly compensated, highly
mobile professionals. 297 Like many professionals (including those in
medicine and law), motion picture and television media professionals'
career paths depend upon skill acquisition rather than being charac-
terized by long-term tenure, they rely upon social networks to obtain
work, they earn relatively high wages, their loyalties run to their pro-
fessions rather than to a relationship to a single employer, and they
accord high value to receiving control and credit for the work they
do.298 Yet unlike most traditional manufacturing and service sector
unions, old media unions enjoy high union density and have been
growing rather than shrinking in membership over the last twenty
years.299 The old media unions accomplished this feat by organizing
around craft and professional identification rather than worksite or
employer-identification; °° offering professional support in the form of
training and skills enhancement, educational opportunities, and on
the job mentoring; sponsoring annual awards recognizing accom-
plishments of their members; functioning as a de facto hiring hall,
maintaining and distributing resumes to production companies; and
negotiating health and retirement insurance benefits with the em-
ployers in the industry which are then maintained and run by the un-
ions, with employer signatories to collective bargaining agreements
contributing to the funds on behalf of the members that they hire.0 1
However, all old media labor contracts contain language allow-
ing individual members to set their own rates of pay above the floor
set in the agreement. °0 The contracts typically contain language al-
lowing for grievances to be filed by high achievers, or "stars," who
allege a breach of a side agreement to a higher rate of pay or addi-
tional benefits beyond the floor in the collective agreement. By pro-
tecting and enforcing the stars' arrangements as well as those of the
less-highly-leveraged workers, the unions ensure the stars' loyalty. 3 
297. See John Amman, Union and the New Economy: Motion Picture and Television Unions
Offer a Model for New Media Professionals, WORKINGUSA, Fall 2002, at 111, 112-13.
298. Id. at 114-15.
299. Id. at 119.
300. Dorothy Sue Cobble has pressed the advantages of occupational organization with
compelling historical evidence from the waitress unions. See DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, DISHING
IT OUT: WAITRESSES AND THEIR UNIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Dorothy Sue
Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial Workforce: Lessons from the History of Waitress Union-
ism, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 419 (1991).
301. Amman, supra note 297, at 120-25.
302. Id. at 126.
303. See id. at 126-27.
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In essence, the old media unions are "hybrids" of traditional la-
bor unions and professional associations. Unlike their traditional un-
ion cousins, old media unions focus on the professional/occupational
identity of their members rather than on a worksite-specific identity
as employees. Rather than "leveling down" individual high-achievers,
the old media unions negotiate minimum terms agreements that leave
stars free to negotiate better deals, thereby preserving the illusion-
and perhaps the reality-of the American Dream. Finally, the old
media unions independently offer benefits that are of great interest
and value to their members, ranging from economic benefits like
insurance to training and networking opportunities.3 04 In this respect,
they resemble the professional associations with which professionals
are already comfortable. Old media unions offer a plausible and de-
tailed blueprint for traditional unions seeking to organize profession-
als, or professional associations who decide to create organizing arms.
The remaining question is whether the law poses an insurmount-
able barrier to professionals' organizing efforts. Might the thesis of
commodification and deprofessionalization developed above provide
a useful basis for arguing for NLRA protection?
VI. THE DIFFERENCE COMMODIFICATION MAKES: PROFESSIONALS
AS EMPLOYEES COVERED UNDER THE NLRA?
The labor and employment laws represent Congress' attempt
through legislation to ameliorate the harshest conditions of commodi-
fied labor. Having abolished slavery, Congress enacted the Clayton
Act of 1914, which proclaimed that "the labor of a human being is not
a commodity or article of commerce."3 5 Other employment laws fol-
lowed, intended to inject humane ideals about work-including mini-
mum standards of pay, safe working conditions, and protection from
discriminatory treatment in the workplace-into the lives of work-
ers.306 These statutes were enacted as a palliative response to the
304. See id. at 128-31.
305. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17
(2000)).
306. See RADIN, supra note 5, at 80, 108. These statutes include the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2000e-17 (2000); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000); the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000); the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2000); the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2654 (2000); the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-
300gg-2 (2000); the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000);
and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (2000).
[Vol179:543
20041 THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL WORKFORCE 605
harms caused to human bodies, psyches, and spirit by the commodifi-
cation of their labor.
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 07 was unique: in-
stead of prescribing minimum standards, it offered a vehicle for
worker self-empowerment. Designed not only to improve productiv-
ity and reduce the incidence of strikes, but also to rectify the imbal-
ance in power between individual workers and employers organized
in the corporate form,338 the NLRA sought to shore up democracy by
creating the opportunity for voice in the workplace.3 °9 Its goal was
more than merely palliative; the Act was the antithesis of the com-
modification of workers.
A. The Inclusion of Professional Employees
The Wagner Act broadly defined the term "employee. 31° Profes-
sional employees are covered under the Act, although particular unit
determination rules apply to them if the Board seeks to combine pro-
fessionals and nonprofessionals in a single unit."' Section 2(12) de-
fines a professional as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual
and varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, me-
chanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of
discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character
that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be stan-
dardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring
knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning cus-
tomarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual
instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospi-
tal, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an
307. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (2000).
308. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
309. See Marion Crain, Building Solidarity Through Expansion of NLRA Coverage: A
Blueprint for Worker Empowerment, 74 MINN. L. REV. 953, 968-69 (1990) (explaining that the
Act's goal of supporting industrial democracy through the provision of a voice mechanism for
workers was linked to the idea that participation in decisionmaking combats feelings of alien-
ation, which in turn enhances productivity) [hereinafter Crain, Building Solidarity]; Marion
Crain, Expanded Employee Drug-Detection Programs and the Public Good: Big Brother at the
Bargaining Table, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1286, 1291-95 (1989) (examining connection between
participatory democracy in the workplace and participation in the larger political process,
worker self-actualization, and productivity).
310. See NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) ("The term 'employee' shall include any
employee....").
311. See NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C § 152(3) (2000) (defining employee); NLRA § 9(b)(1), 29
U.S.C. §159(b)(1) (2000) (requiring a majority vote for professionals in order to include them in
a unit with nonprofessionals).
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apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine men-
tal, manual, or physical processes.311
The statutory definition is consistent with sociologists' descrip-
tion of the distinguishing features of professionals: expertise attained
through lengthy education, work characterized by discretion or judg-
ment, and resistant to standardization by unit of time.
B. The Supervisor Exclusion
Supervisors were covered prior to the 1947 Taft-Hartley
Amendments. 313 Reacting to the Supreme Court's decision in Packard
Motor Car and reasoning that employers needed front line "faithful
agents" to carry out their policies in a hierarchically ordered work-
place, Congress amended the Act in 1947 to exclude supervisors14
The rationale for this amendment was twofold: (1) fears that supervi-
sors' loyalties would be divided between the employer and the rank
and file workers joined in solidarity with supervisors in unions; and
(2) prevention of the leveling effects of seniority, uniformity, and
standardization that unionism was assumed to produce on otherwise
upwardly mobile workers.3"5 The divided loyalties rationale was par-
ticularly powerful with regard to supervisors. Congress worried that
supervisors would subordinate the employer's interests to those of
rank and file workers, either out of feelings of solidarity with them or
to gain their support in a strike.
Section 2(11) of the NLRA defines a supervisor as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires
the use of independent judgment.3 16
The Court has reframed this definition as a three-part test. It
asks: (1) "[D]oes the employee have the authority to engage in 1 of
the 12 listed [functions]?"(2) "[D]oes the exercise of [this] authority
312. NLRA § 2(12), 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1994).
313. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
314. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (excluding supervisors from the definition of employees
covered by the Act); 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2000) (defining supervisors so excluded).
315. Crain, Building Solidarity, supra note 309, at 972-73; H.R.Rep. No. 80-245, at 15-16
(1947), reprinted in NLRB, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 292, 306-07 (1948).
316. NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2000).
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require the 'use of independent judgment' (rather than being of a
merely routine or clerical nature)?; and (3) "[D]oes the employee
hold the authority 'in the interest of the employer'?" If the answer to
all three questions is yes, the individual is a supervisor excluded from
the Act's protections.
3 17
C. Professionals As Supervisors?
In two cases raising the issue of the intersection between the two
categories of workers, the Supreme Court significantly broadened the
definition of supervisors excluded from the Act's coverage.3 18 In
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, the employer
had disciplined four licensed practical nurses who filed unfair labor
charges with the Board. The employer contended that the nurses
were not covered employees, and hence the NLRA's protections did
not apply to them. The Board attempted to resolve the tension be-
tween the Act's inclusion of professionals in Section 2(12) and its
exclusion of supervisors in Section 2(3): the Board held that the
nurses were professionals covered under the Act rather than excluded
supervisors, reasoning that professionals who utilized independent
judgment in connection with patient care pursuant to their profes-
sional judgment would be acting in their own interests as profession-
als rather than in the employer's interests, and so would fail the third
step of the analysis outlined above. The Sixth Circuit, and ultimately
the Supreme Court, disagreed, and found that the nurses were super-
visors. The Court reasoned that the Board had created a "false di-
chotomy" between professional interests in patient care and the
employer's interests. Proclaimed the Court, "[t]hat dichotomy makes
no sense. Patient care is business of a nursing home, and it follows
that attending to the needs of the nursing home patients, who are the
317. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 574 (1994) (quoting North-
crest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. 491,493 (1993)).
318. The Court has also created an additional exclusion from coverage, the managerial
exclusion, which is implied from the explicit supervisory exclusion. In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), the Court ruled that because managerial workers occupy a higher
status position in the workplace hierarchy than do supervisory workers, they are impliedly
excluded from coverage under the Act as well. Subsequently, in NLRB v. Yeshiva University,
444 U.S. 672 (1979), the Court ruled that the faculty at Yeshiva University were managerial, on
the basis that faculty played a role in the administration of the university through their deci-
sionmaking on academic matters, including curriculum, admissions, scheduling, grading, and
teaching methodologies. Such ideological control-over the product produced, the terms upon
which it is offered, and the customers who will be served-was consistent with managerial status
and thus the professors were excluded from the Act's coverage. Id. at 686.
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employer's customers, is in the interest of the employer."' 19 Thus,
nurses who use independent judgment to responsibly direct aides in
matters of patient care are supervisors.
The Court's view of professionals as employees of the firm tend-
ing to the firm's interest rather than professionals treating patients is
consonant with the bureaucratized system in which many profession-
als now work. Such a conceptualization of professionals tends to iso-
late them from their patients, severing one of the links that
distinguished professionalism, the intangibility of their product and
the personal nature of the professional service. The Court's decision
thus underscores the loss of a critical aspect of professional identity in
a bureaucratized workplace.
In NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.,320 the union
sought to represent a unit of professional and nonprofessional em-
ployees at the employer's Caney Creek Development Complex. The
employer objected to the inclusion of Caney Creek's six registered
nurses in the bargaining unit, on the basis that they were supervisors
excluded from coverage under the Act. The Board found that the
employer had the burden to prove that the nurses were supervisors
and therefore not covered, and that it had failed to carry its burden. 321
The Board reasoned that the nurses were not supervisors because
they did not exercise "independent judgment" within the meaning of
Section 2(11) when they used ordinary professional or technical
judgment to direct lesser skilled employees to deliver services in ac-
cordance with employer-specified standards. 322 Because the nurses
exercised their professional judgment rather than their judgment on
behalf of management, the Board considered that defining them as
supervisors would cancel out the inclusion of professionals under Sec-
tion 2(12).323 The union won the election and was certified as the rep-
resentative of the employees.
The Supreme Court again simplified and broadened the defini-
tion of supervisor, rejecting the newest dichotomy established by the
Board. It affirmed the Sixth Circuit, which had again reversed the
Board, and ruled that while the employer did have the burden to
prove that the nurses were supervisors excluded from coverage, it had
319. Heath Care & Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. at 577.
320. 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
321. Id. at 709.
322. Id. at 710.
323. Id. at 720.
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shouldered that burden. The Court characterized employees as su-
pervisors if they "exercise 'independent judgment' in 'responsibly...
directing' other employees 'in the interest of the employer."' The
Court held that the use of ordinary professional or technical judgment
in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services constituted in-
dependent judgment that resulted in exclusion. The fact that the
judgment was professional and that Congress expressly included pro-
fessionals within the sweep of the Act's coverage did not exempt it
from the test; the Board was wrong to categorically exclude profes-
sional judgments from the term "independent judgment," which natu-
rally includes them . 24 Although conceding the soundness of the
Board's argument as a matter of labor policy, the Court found that
the statutory text of Section 2(11) simply did not support it. Noting
that the Board's interpretation of the statute turned on factors that
had no relationship to the degree of discretion exercised by the em-
ployee-for even if the employer allowed the exercise of significant
independent judgment and discretion, the Board's interpretation
would require that if the discretion permitted is professional or tech-
nical, or based on greater experience, then the employee would be
included in the Act's coverage as an employee-Justice Scalia asked
sarcastically, "What supervisory judgment worth exercising, one must
wonder, does not rest on 'professional or technical skill or experi-
ence'? 325
Although the Court noted the tension created between the ex-
clusion of supervisors and the inclusion of professionals, who by defi-
nition engage in work "involving the consistent exercise of discretion
and judgment" as defined in Section 2 (12)(a)(ii), it viewed the ten-
sion as being of Congress' making. Justice Scalia did note in dicta that
the Board might offer a "limiting interpretation of the supervisory
function of responsible direction by distinguishing employees who
direct the manner of others' performance of discrete tasks from em-
ployees who direct other employees, as § 152(11) requires." 326 Since
324. Id. at 721.
325. Id. at 715.
326. Id. at 720 (citing Providence Hospital, 320 N.L.R.B. 717, 729 (1996), enforced, 121 F.3d
548 (9th Cir. 1997)). In Providence Hospital, the Board interpreted the term "assignment" in
§ 2(11) to include "the assignment of an employee's hours or shift, the assignment of an em-
ployee to a department or other division, or other overall job responsibilities." 320 N.L.R.B. at
727. The Board focused particularly on the preparation of monthly schedules as the sort of
assignment that would be closely related to managerial functions and hence, supervisorial in
nature. Id. at 731. The Board noted, though, that "[wihether assignment also includes ordering
an employee to perform a specific task is... less clear." Id. at 727. The Board did not explore
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the issue had not been raised in the case before it, the Court did not
consider the question. Cases raising the issue before the Board post-
Kentucky River are still winding their way through the administrative
process; administrative law judges have thus far concluded in the bulk
of pending cases that physicians and nurses remain non-supervisory.327
Nonetheless, most labor unionists believe that the case poses a sig-
nificant hurdle to obtaining protection for organizing efforts dedi-
cated toward professionals. The AMA, for example, discontinued its
organizing efforts following the Court's decision in Kentucky River,
believing the legal climate to be "hostile" to physician organizing. 328
the question further because it found that the employees were included professionals rather
than excluded supervisors because the judgment exercised was based on their professional
training or skill rather than constituting an independent judgment in management's interest.
This interpretation, subsequently rejected by Kentucky River, requires that the Board return to
the question of considering whether supervisory status attaches to those who direct the per-
formance of tasks rather than people, pursuing a parallel analysis to that which it conducted in
Providence on the meaning of the term "assign."
327. See, e.g., Occupational Health Ctrs. of N.J., PA, 22-RC-11944 (Jan. 31, 2002), available
at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared-files/decisins/dde/22/22-RC-11944.pdf (finding New Jersey
physicians employed by Occupational Health Centers of New Jersey and Concentra Managed
Care, Inc, not supervisors); PRN Scores Major Victory With NLRB Decision New Jersey Physi-
cians Not Supervisors, Feb. 1, 2002, at http://www.4prn.org/pr2OO202Ol.html (discussing the
Occupational Health Centers of New Jersey decision); Advocates Health & Hosp. Corp., 13-RC-
20426 (2001), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/sharedfiles/decisions/dde/2000/13-RC-
20426.pdf (finding chief resident at a hospital not a supervisor).
In the sole case on which the Board has rendered an opinion on the supervisory status
of physicians post-Kentucky River, the record was not sufficiently developed to require the
Board to address the substantive legal issues surrounding supervisory status. See St. Barnabas
Hosp., 334 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1000 n.2 (2001) (refusing to reopen the record to address the em-
ployer's contention, post-Kentucky River, that physicians were not supervisors where the em-
ployer relied upon a record formed in 1999, pre-Kentucky River, and thus failed to present
sufficient evidence of physicians' supervisory status to sustain its burden of proof to show super-
visory status); see also Lutheran Home at Moorestown, 334 N.L.R.B. 340 (2001) (finding that
employer waived issue by not raising it in representation proceeding prior to decision in Ken-
tucky River). But see Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 635 (2001). On review,
the D.C. Circuit affirmed the Board's ruling because the Board had re-evaluated the AL's
conclusion that the nurses were not supervisors in light of the new standard announced in Ken-
tucky River. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 317 F.3d 316, 324 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
2003). The Board found that the AL's conclusion was supported by the factual record because
the nurses exercised only "routine" authority that did not entail the use of independent judg-
ment. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. at 635 n.3, 669-70.
Most recently, the Board has granted review of the Regional Directors' decisions in
three cases raising issues about the meaning of the phrases "independent judgment," "de-
gree/scope of discretion," "responsibly to direct," and other related issues determining the
extent of the supervisory exclusion after Kentucky River, and solicited briefs from all parties and
interested amici. See NLRB Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, Oakwood HealthCare, Inc.;
Beverly-Enterprises-Minnesota, Inc.; and Croft Metals, Inc., DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 144,
July 28, 2003, at E-1.
328. See supra note 197.
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D. The Link Between Deprofessionalization and Coverage
The Court's interpretation of the term "supervisor" is now so
broad that it risks obliterating the inclusion of professionals under the
Act. It would seem that nearly all professional employees will be
swept into the definition of supervisor if they perform professional
services in a bureaucratized environment where they work in teams
with other professionals and are required to direct other less-skilled
medical care personnel. The relative status of professionals in the
workplace hierarchy and their possession of expert knowledge almost
guarantees that they will be required to delegate tasks to others and
to direct the performance of such tasks.329 The more bureaucratized
the environment and the more profit-maximizing the business plan,
the more such delegation and direction will be required. Thus, the
more deskilled the professional, the more direction and delegation
she will perform, and the more likely she will be to be characterized
as a supervisor! Moreover, in multi-professional worksites organized
around a team care concept, nearly every professional will have suffi-
cient authority to direct others to perform tasks, even those above
them in the status hierarchy, and consequently all would be supervi-
sors excluded from coverage.
Surely this ironic result cannot be consonant with Congress' goal
of avoiding divided loyalties. Professionals, it might be argued, were
never really at risk of possessing divided loyalties anyhow, since (1)
they cannot be included with a bargaining unit with other employees
absent a majority vote of professionals, and (2) they are professionals
first, employees second, answering to the clarion call of professional
codes of ethics.
Putting aside what Congress might have intended, there are two
routes that might be taken to argue for professionals' inclusion in the
Act's coverage even if they are required to give direction in the
workplace. The first is deceptively simple: If professionals have been
deprofessionalized, they arguably lack the independent judgment
required by the second prong of the Court's test. Notwithstanding
Justice Scalia's rhetorical question ("what supervisory judgment
329. For example, in one case now on review before the Board, the Regional Director found
that all 140 registered nurses employed by an acute care hospital are supervisors, because they
"responsibly direct" over 100 less highly trained employees including licensed practical nurses,
ward clerks, escorts, auxiliary nurses, and technicians. See M. Pavia Hernandez, Inc., 26-RC-
8289 (Oct. 6,2001), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/sharedfiles/decisions/dde/2001/26-RC-
8289.pdf.
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worth exercising, one must wonder, does not rest on professional or
technical skill or experience?"), the only reason that one would pre-
sume that the judgment was independent in the first place would be
that it was made by a professional. If the professional has in fact been
deprofessionalized by the employer's usurpation of technical as well
as ideological control over the labor process, then the professional is,
in fact, no longer a professional precisely because she lacks the
autonomy to make "independent" judgments.330 In other words, her
status should be analyzed identically to that of any other employee,
rather than applying the Court's assumption that she is a professional
and therefore, that her judgments will be "independent." If the direc-
tion given is one that is merely routine, or even clerical-mandated
by critical care pathways or protocols, for example-then it is not
supervisory.
Some support can be found for this proposition in the Court's
embrace of the Board's argument that "the degree of judgment that
might ordinarily be required to conduct a particular task may be re-
duced below the statutory threshold by detailed orders and regula-
tions issued by the employer."33' Such detailed regulations might
include checklists of tasks, flow charts dictating medical care decisions
at each juncture, and similar constraining rules typical of managed
care utilization review. Alternatively, as one recent case illustrated,
they might assume the form of state or federal laws, which in turn
dictate hospital protocols and standing orders.33 In essence, this ar-
330. As the Board stated in Amerihealth Inc., physicians were not necessarily disqualified
from employee status by the failure of the HMO to exercise substantial control over physicians'
conduct in examining patients, diagnosing illnesses, and prescribing treatment or performing
medical procedures, because "it is not customary in the medical profession for fully trained
physicians... to be subject to substantial controls over the manner in which they perform their
professional duties." Amerihealth Inc, 329 N.L.R.B. 870, 870 n.1 (1999).
331. NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713-14. In one case decided
by the Board after Kentucky River, the Board ruled that where instructions given by workers
are "circumscribed by detailed orders and regulations issued by the Employer and other stan-
dard operating procedures," the worker giving such instructions does not exercise sufficient
independent judgment to render him a supervisor. See Dynamic Sci., Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 391, 391
(2001); see also Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 635, 635 n.3, 669-70 (2001)
(finding that RNs do not exercise independent judgment when they assign duties to lower
skilled employees where the duties are dictated or constrained by patient care plans), affd in
relevant part, 317 F.3d 316 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
332. See Third Coast Emergency Physicians, P.A., 330 N.L.R.B. 756 (2000) (finding that
emergency room physicians are not supervisors because they direct tasks performed by mid-
level providers such as nurse practitioners and physician assistants, pursuant to Texas law man-
dating accountability to ensure adherence to hospital protocols and federal law regarding stan-
dards in patient chart preparation). Third Coast Emergency Physicians was a pre-Kentucky
River decision, but its reasoning is consistent with Justice Scalia's suggestion that those who
supervise the performance of tasks rather than people may not be supervisors. Analogous
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gument uses the fact of the deprofessionalization of professions to
argue for their nonsupervisorial status. To the extent that profession-
als' jobs have been micromanaged so that each task performed has
been standardized, it is arguable that professionals now lack the inde-
pendent judgment to direct other personnel. Thus, professionals are
not supervisors because they are no longer professionals! Ironically,
the management strategy of deprofessionalization that prompted pro-
fessional unionization in the first place may ultimately furnish the
shield against categorization as a supervisor excluded from NLRA
coverage.
Alternatively, the Board might avail itself of Justice Scalia's lim-
iting interpretation, defining the scope of supervisory authority by
reference to whether the professional directs people on an ongoing
basis (in which case she is a supervisor), or simply directs the per-
formance of discrete tasks (in which case she is a covered profes-
sional). If the tasks delegated to others are so standardized and
routine that lesser level employees can be instructed to do them with-
out further supervision or oversight, the person giving direction can
be said to be supervising only tasks rather than people. It might fur-
ther be argued that the deskilled professional must, out of necessity,
direct 'he performance of tasks that would once have been part of her
professional duties but are now, for cost-efficiency reasons, delegated
to a lesser-skilled worker. Thus, the cost-efficiency purposes of the
delegation of tasks preclude an employer argument that the profes-
sional was charged with overseeing people, since such would be a
waste of the time saved by delegating the tasks in the first place and
could not have been the employer's purpose in structuring its bu-
reaucracy as it has. This argument might be most successful where the
professional retains discretion and independent judgment within the
narrow bailiwick of her own professional duties, but has been di-
vested of it relative to duties that have been carved out and assigned
to others. Only independent judgment that is supervisory in nature
(involving the direction or assignment of tasks or supervision of oth-
ers), counts in the assessment of whether the professional is function-
ing as a supervisor.
authority is available under the FLSA. See Schaefer v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., 358 F.3d
394 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that nuclear waste environmental specialists may lack day-to-day
discretion and independent judgment required for FLSA exemption because his decisions are
dictated by Department of Transportation and Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules, which
create conformity, minimize discretion, and divest employees of independent judgment).
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The most persuasive aspect of both of these arguments is that
they are accurate to a fault. That is, the reason that the professionals
are seeking to organize and bargain collectively is in response to the
commodification of their labor brought about by the employer's
strategy of deprofessionalization. The employer cannot have it both
ways: either the professionals enjoy professional privilege and retain
at least a modicum of technical control over the labor process (in
which case perhaps they will have sufficient bargaining clout to
achieve their collective goals even without the Act's umbrella of pro-
tections), or they have been deprofessionalized, in which case they
lack the independent judgment (which might otherwise be presumed
to stem from their professional status) to responsibly direct other
employees.
CONCLUSION: MUSINGS ABOUT WORKERS, PROFESSIONAL
IDENTITY, AND ORGANIZING
When professional status is challenged at its core, as it has been
throughout the 1980s and 1990s by managerial cost cutting strategies
and bureaucratization, professionals feel their work becoming com-
modified and their identity questioned. Perhaps it should not surprise
us that such a challenge has led to organizing, even among groups not
previously believed to be strongly disposed toward union organizing.
As one organizer aptly put it, "it is conditions that threaten identity
that compel people to action. It is an assault on one's basic sense of
self that leads people to get angry, to take risks, to extend their
reach. " 333
Where their investment in professional training and status is so
significant, and especially where the deprofessionalization of an oc-
cupation is industry-wide, professionals are likely to prefer voice (un-
ionization) over exit.334 Professionals have become more receptive to
collective strategies that offer the hope of reprofessionalization on an
occupation-wide level. Organizing issues for professional employees
and white-collar employees thus revolve primarily around dignity and
professional autonomy rather than around purely economic issues,
although economic issues can also become central as a powerful sym-
bolic reflection of the esteem in which the professionals' cultural capi-
333. Roberta Lynch, Organizing Clericals: Problems & Prospects, LAB. RES. REV, Fall 1985,
at 91, 96.
334. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 288, at 53.
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tal is held. The goal of professional organizing is to protect profes-
sional identity, which includes both a privileged class status and ideo-
logical and technical control over particular areas of expertise. 335
Professional organizing is an expression of outrage at the breach
of the social contract between professionals and society, which pro-
fessionals believed would shield them from commodification. As bu-
reacratization and scientific management commodify employed
professionals' labor, their similarities to other workers become more
pronounced and the differences of less significance, pointing toward
the need for coverage under the labor laws. If unions can reconceptu-
alize themselves to provide some of the best features of professional
associations (skills training, support for professional achievements
and goals at an individual level) while retaining the leverage of collec-
tive action and organization, professionals may embrace them. If un-
ions build it, perhaps professionals will come.
335. See Craver, supra note 188, at 44-46; Rabban, supra note 14; David M. Rabban, Is
Unionization Compatible With Professionalism?, 45 IND. LAB. REL. REV. 97 (1991); Hurd,
supra note 61 (observing that freedom to exercise professional autonomy is at the top of the list
of organizing issues for professionals).

